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Security audit

Log Diagnostics Toolbox

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill analyzes selected logs locally and saves reports while preserving the source files.

Select only logs you intend to analyze. Reports remain local but may retain sensitive routes or error messages despite partial redaction, so review them before sharing. Reports and the disclosed local state database remain until you remove them.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (5)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · tests/smoke.py (reported line 22)May include surrounding context.

python
class CoreTests(Base):
 def test_traversal(self):
  for name in ('../escape','a/../../escape','/etc/passwd','C:/Windows/test'):
   with self.assertRaises(ValueError):local(self.root,name)
 def test_existing_output_refused(self):
  p=self.file('one.txt','old')

Skill declares no tool scope ('permissions' or 'allowed-tools') but code capabilities were detected: file_read, file_write, network, shell.

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The log-analysis runtime includes an outbound HTTP client with remote mutation capabilities unrelated to its stated purpose (L090–L115).

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The manifest describes analyzing access, JSONL application, and GZIP logs, but safe_request implements outbound network requests, including POST, PUT, PATCH, and DELETE with caller-supplied headers and bodies. These capabilities are not needed for the stated log-analysis functions; this file defines the capability but does not demonstrate that it is invoked.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Scope Creep

Low
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Skill's behavior or capabilities extend beyond its stated purpose. Scope creep allows an agent to perform actions unrelated to its documented functionality, increasing the attack surface.

Content

Scanner excerpt · LICENSE (reported line 7)May include surrounding context.

text
Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so.

THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.

Every invocation silently creates persistent workspace state in a hidden directory.

Low
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

Store initialization creates .mochilab/<name>/state.sqlite and initializes its schema, and runmain performs this initialization before dispatching every valid request. No comment, docstring, confirmation, or user-facing message discloses this persistent filesystem change, including for operations that might otherwise be read-only.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.