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Security audit

Entity Relationship Memory

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill provides user-directed local relationship storage, with disclosed persistence and no active network or background behavior.

Stored relationships and exported reports remain on disk without application-level encryption. Use authorized information, approve sensitive details before storage, and protect or remove the .mochilab/entity-graph/ and exports/entity-graph/ folders when appropriate.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (6)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The reported general-purpose HTTP functionality exceeds a local relationship-memory workflow and could enable disclosure of stored information or unauthorized remote changes if an agent invokes it with sensitive data or credentials. Explicitly allowing private hosts limits, but does not eliminate, internal-service exposure, while plain HTTP can expose request contents in transit. This assessment relies on the static capability report because the implementation and its authorization controls were not supplied; the skill's privacy instructions are helpful but do not enforce these boundaries.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Skill declares no tool scope ('permissions' or 'allowed-tools') but code capabilities were detected: file_read, file_write, network, shell.

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The local entity-graph runtime includes an unrelated outbound HTTP client with remote mutation support (L090–L107).

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The manifest describes storing source-linked entities, traversing relationships, and exporting a local graph. The implemented HTTP helper supports arbitrary destinations and methods including POST, PUT, PATCH, and DELETE, which are not justified by that purpose; this file does not show the helper being invoked.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

HTTP requests can transmit caller-supplied data without disclosure.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

safe_request sends caller-supplied headers and request bodies to the specified host without a confirmation, user-facing notice, or explanatory docstring/comment about the transmission. HTTPS and address restrictions protect the connection but do not disclose that supplied data may leave the system.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Scope Creep

Low
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Skill's behavior or capabilities extend beyond its stated purpose. Scope creep allows an agent to perform actions unrelated to its documented functionality, increasing the attack surface.

Content

Scanner excerpt · LICENSE (reported line 7)May include surrounding context.

text
Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so.

THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.

Every invocation silently creates persistent workspace state.

Low
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

Store initialization creates a .mochilab directory and SQLite database and commits a schema, and runmain invokes it before calling the handler. These persistent workspace changes have no explanatory comment/docstring or user-facing notice in the supplied file, so even an otherwise read-only invocation can modify the workspace without disclosure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.