OpenClaw Maintenance and Migration Desk

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Oct 26, 2026 · 8:24 PM UTC
• Version: 1.0.2

Overview

This skill provides clearly scoped local backups and recovery rehearsals, with disclosed handling of sensitive credentials.

Confirm the selected instance and use a maintenance folder accessible only to you. Archives and restored copies contain usable credentials; keep them private. External workspaces need separate backups, and successful rehearsal does not prove a working live migration. Prefer a fixed installer version for reproducibility.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
• Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation: Obtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
• Behavioral AST: exec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
• Taint Tracking: Direct Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
• MCP Least Privilege: Underdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration

Findings (8)

Env Variable Harvesting

High

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Code enumerates, copies, or searches environment variables for secrets. Bulk environment access can collect credentials unrelated to the skill's stated purpose.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/run.py (reported line 75)May include surrounding context.

python

config,inv=inventory(root)
  if action=='cli-status':
   binary=shutil.which('openclaw');require(binary,'OpenClaw CLI is not installed on this host')
   env={**os.environ,'OPENCLAW_STATE_DIR':str(root),'OPENCLAW_CONFIG_PATH':str(root/'openclaw.json')};rows=[]
   # Only read-only CLI commands. No model calls, repair, update, restart or sends.
   for args in [['--version'],['gateway','status','--json'],['agents','list','--json']]:
    try:

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx clawhub'.

Medium

• Category: MCP Rug Pull
• Confidence: 96% confidence

Finding

The command npx clawhub@latest install @hznetnewpower/mochi-claw-maintenance executes a dynamically resolved CLI version rather than a reviewed, fixed release; it is an installer CLI, not an MCP server as the finding labels it. A compromised future release could execute code with the installing user's privileges and access local configuration or workspaces, which may contain sensitive agent credentials and bindings. This is a supply-chain exposure, not evidence that the current package or skill is malicious.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx clawhub'.

Medium

• Category: MCP Rug Pull
• Confidence: 95% confidence

Finding

The documented command uses npx clawhub@latest, which can download and execute a changing npm package version rather than a reviewed, fixed release. Although the finding incorrectly describes this CLI as an MCP server, the underlying supply-chain risk is real: a compromised future release could execute with the installing user's permissions. Installation in an assistant workspace associated with OpenClaw configurations and private backups increases the potential consequences, though no malicious behavior is demonstrated here.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Skill declares no tool scope ('permissions' or 'allowed-tools') but code capabilities were detected: env, file_read, file_write, shell.

Medium

• Category: MCP Least Privilege
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium

• Category: Dangerous Code Execution
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/run.py (reported line 79)May include surrounding context.

python

# Only read-only CLI commands. No model calls, repair, update, restart or sends.
   for args in [['--version'],['gateway','status','--json'],['agents','list','--json']]:
    try:
     result=subprocess.run([binary,*args],env=env,capture_output=True,text=True,encoding='utf8',errors='replace',timeout=45,shell=False)
     try:details=redact(json.loads(result.stdout)) if result.stdout.strip().startswith(('{','[')) else None
     except ValueError:details=None
     rows.append({'command':['openclaw',*args],'returncode':result.returncode,'json':details,'outputSuppressed':details is None})

subprocess module call

Medium

• Category: Dangerous Code Execution
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · tests/smoke.py (reported line 62)May include surrounding context.

python

self.assertRaises(ValueError,claw.inspect_archive,p)
 def test_cli_root_overlap_rejected(self):
  import subprocess
  result=subprocess.run([sys.executable,'-B',str(Path(claw.__file__)), '--workspace',str(self.root),'--instance-root',str(self.root),'--input','missing.json'],capture_output=True,text=True)
  self.assertNotEqual(result.returncode,0);self.assertIn('separate maintenance workspace',result.stderr+result.stdout)

if __name__=="__main__":unittest.main(verbosity=2)

Tainted flow: 'self.root' from os.environ.get (line 24, credential/environment) → subprocess.run (code execution)

Medium

• Category: Data Flow
• Confidence: 65% confidence

Finding

Data from a source is assigned to a variable that is later passed to a sink, creating a variable-mediated taint flow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · tests/smoke.py (reported line 62)May include surrounding context.

python

self.assertRaises(ValueError,claw.inspect_archive,p)
 def test_cli_root_overlap_rejected(self):
  import subprocess
  result=subprocess.run([sys.executable,'-B',str(Path(claw.__file__)), '--workspace',str(self.root),'--instance-root',str(self.root),'--input','missing.json'],capture_output=True,text=True)
  self.assertNotEqual(result.returncode,0);self.assertIn('separate maintenance workspace',result.stderr+result.stdout)

if __name__=="__main__":unittest.main(verbosity=2)

Scope Creep

Low

• Category: Excessive Agency
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Skill's behavior or capabilities extend beyond its stated purpose. Scope creep allows an agent to perform actions unrelated to its documented functionality, increasing the attack surface.

Content

Scanner excerpt · LICENSE (reported line 7)May include surrounding context.

text

Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so.

THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.