Back to skill

Security audit

OpenClaw Upgrade

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill appears to be a straightforward OpenClaw upgrade guide, but it uses broad triggers and recommends persistent global package-manager changes that deserve review before installation.

Install only if you specifically want OpenClaw upgrade assistance for a GitHub-restricted environment. Before following the commands, confirm the exact OpenClaw version and registry source, avoid running package-manager installs as root, and be aware that changing the Yarn registry or restarting the gateway can affect future operations.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:22
Finding

Unpinned Global Installation of a Mutable Third-Party Package

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 22–24
Vulnerability Type: T08: Insecure Dependencies
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code Snippet:

bash
yarn global add openclaw@latest

Technical Analysis

The skill recommends globally installing the mutable latest release of the openclaw package without pinning an audited version or verifying its integrity. Because the latest npm distribution tag can be changed by the package publisher or by an attacker who compromises the publisher or registry account, the package installed at execution time may differ from the version reviewed when this skill was created.

A global Yarn installation may also execute package lifecycle scripts, such as preinstall, install, or postinstall, under the privileges of the user running the command. The documentation does not require lockfile enforcement, checksum or signature verification, lifecycle-script suppression, or validation of the resolved package version and source.

This is a supply-chain exposure rather than evidence that the current openclaw package is malicious.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises the package publisher, registry account, or a dependency used by a future openclaw release.
  2. The attacker publishes a malicious release and assigns it to the latest distribution tag.
  3. A user follows the skill and runs yarn global add openclaw@latest.
  4. Yarn resolves the attacker-controlled version and downloads its package and dependency graph.
  5. Malicious lifecycle scripts may execute during installation, or malicious behavior may run when the globally installed openclaw command is invoked.

Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation could execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the user performing the installation. Potential effects include modification of user-accessible files, theft of credentials or configuration data, replacement of the globally instal ...[truncated 312 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Replace openclaw@latest with an explicitly reviewed and pinned version, for example:
    bash
    yarn global add openclaw@2026.3.13
    
  • Confirm the package metadata and resolved version before installation:
    bash
    yarn info openclaw@2026.3.13 version dist
    
  • Verify published integrity data, provenance, signatures, or trusted release checksums where supported.
  • Test upgrades in an isolated container or non-privileged staging environment before deploying them to production.
  • Avoid running package-manager installation commands as root.
  • Consider initially disabling lifecycle scripts where operationally feasible:
    bash
    yarn global add openclaw@2026.3.13 --ignore-scripts
    
    Required native build or setup steps should then be reviewed and performed explicitly.
  • Document a controlled upgrade process that reviews release notes, dependency changes, package ownership, and the exact registry source before changing the pinned version.
  • If a mirror is used, require a trusted mirror and verify that its package integrity metadata matches the authoritative registry.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (2)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The trigger phrases are broad enough to match generic requests like '更新系统' or '网络问题升级', which could invoke this skill outside its intended OpenClaw-specific context. That can cause the agent to apply package-management actions or upgrade guidance to unrelated situations, increasing the chance of incorrect or unsafe operational advice.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
83% confidence
Finding

The skill documentation is written entirely in Chinese and does not indicate that the user can choose another language or locale. Under the stated policy, forcing a specific language without opt-in can be a natural-language policy violation unless the locale constraint is explicitly justified.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.