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Security audit

html-publisher

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill’s core HTML publishing behavior is clear, but it tells users to install an unpinned third-party CLI globally, which deserves review before use.

Review the gnomic-cli package and prefer a pinned, trusted version before installing. Do not run the global install with elevated privileges, and only publish HTML that is safe to make public.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:99
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party CLI Installed Globally

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 99–111
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependency installed globally
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

markdown
## 补充:命令不可用时

如果执行 `gnomic` 命令时提示找不到命令,说明 `gnomic-cli` 尚未安装,执行以下命令安装:

```bash
npm install -g gnomic-cli

gnomic-cli开源地址:https://github.com/huyi9531/gnomic_cli

text

### Technical Analysis

The Skill directs users or agents to install the latest available version of the third-party `gnomic-cli` npm package globally. The command does not pin a reviewed version, enforce a known integrity hash, use a lockfile, or verify package provenance.

Because npm packages can define installation lifecycle scripts, installing the package may execute package-controlled code with the permissions of the account running npm. The global installation scope also allows the package to place commands in the user's global executable path. The linked source repository does not, by itself, establish that the downloaded npm artifact corresponds to reviewed source code.

This is a supply-chain weakness rather than evidence that the current package is malicious. Exploitation requires the package, a future release, its maintainer account, or its distribution channel to be compromised.

### Attack Path

1. An attacker compromises the npm package, its maintainer account, or the package publication process.
2. The attacker publishes a malicious release under the existing `gnomic-cli` package name.
3. A user or agent follows the Skill and runs `npm install -g gnomic-cli`.
4. npm resolves the mutable package name to the attacker-controlled release.
5. Malicious lifecycle code can execute during installation with the invoking user's permissions.
6. The package can also install a globally accessible executable that runs attacker-controlled logic when the documented `gnomic` command is invoked.

### Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation could p
...[truncated 558 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Pin gnomic-cli to a specific reviewed version instead of resolving the latest mutable release:
    bash
    npm install --global gnomic-cli@<reviewed-version>
    
  2. Record and verify the expected package integrity digest and package provenance before installation.
  3. Confirm that the npm artifact matches the reviewed source repository and release commit.
  4. Prefer a project-local, lockfile-controlled dependency over a global installation where practical.
  5. Avoid elevated installation privileges and document that the command must not be run with sudo or an administrator account.
  6. Where compatible with the package, disable npm lifecycle scripts during installation and explicitly review any required installation scripts before enabling them.
  7. Maintain an approved-version policy and repeat the security review before updating the pinned version.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (1)

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The file’s natural-language content is entirely in Chinese, including the manifest description and all user-facing instructions, with no indication that language selection is optional. Under the policy, forcing a specific language without user opt-in is a natural-language locale violation unless the constraint is clearly documented and justified.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.