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Security audit

huawei-cloud-flexus-l-server-openclaw-deployment

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This deployment skill needs review because setup broadens agent access, logs secrets, and enables recurring charges without clearly disclosing those changes.

Before using this version, require fixes that preserve tool restrictions, use owner-selected sender lists, redact secrets, honor the execution-user option, and make payment and renewal explicit choices. Use narrowly scoped temporary cloud credentials and private or TLS-protected administrative access. If already run, review billing and agent access settings and rotate secrets printed in execution output. All bundled files were inspected, including the scanner's partial-coverage files; deployment behavior and resolved dependency versions remain untested. The evidence supports Review, without establishing intentional theft or malicious payload delivery.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/userdata/multi_channel.sh
Finding

Channel installation enables unrestricted sender access

Content
View full analysis

Impact

Unapproved channel users can invoke the connected agent rather than being restricted to an owner-selected sender list. Exposure of data or tools depends on the agent's remaining permissions; arbitrary host execution is not established by this finding alone.

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/userdata/multi_model.sh
Finding

Installing a model silently changes the agent to the full tool profile

Content
View full analysis

Impact

An agent previously restricted by its tool profile receives a broader tool set for subsequent interactions. Untrusted messages or content can consequently encounter capabilities the owner had deliberately excluded. Other independent tool restrictions may still apply.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (101)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Most of the script directly supports the declared model-configuration purpose, and dependency installation and configuration backups are supporting implementation details. However, changing the tools profile and removing Skillhub are independent changes to tool availability and plugin configuration, not required to configure model providers. These changes occur before provider validation and can persist even if subsequent model configuration fails. The supplied chunk therefore contains material undeclared behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The main deployment and configuration functionality matches the description, and supporting script transport, gateway restarts, and status checks are consistent with that purpose. However, automatic recurring purchases, unrestricted remote scripting, and authentication-data logging are material behaviors not represented by the description. The supplied code does not visibly enable Web UI access, so that part is consistent. The bundled shell scripts were not supplied, limiting assessment of their internal behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The Web UI verification opens a network port and uses public HTTP without warning about exposure or unencrypted traffic.

High
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The verification procedure directs users to expose an administrative interface on a public IP and access it over unencrypted HTTP. This can expose session credentials and sensitive administrative traffic to interception, while an unrestricted security-group rule would also increase remote attack exposure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/lib.py (reported line 956)May include surrounding context.

python
"""Generate shell lines that extract a bundled script onto the remote host.

    The returned snippet base64-encodes the bundled script content and writes it
    to ``dest`` as a plain file (no ``curl ... | bash`` chain), so no code is
    fetched from external servers at execution time.

    Args:

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

There is no tool-parameter injection because the command is constant, but this duplicates the genuine global-runtime trust-boundary issue. Pointing /usr/local/bin/node into an application-user-writable tree can allow that account to control code executed by privileged consumers.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/lib.py (reported line 1274)May include surrounding context.

python
cess.run(
            ["bash", "-c", install_command],
            capture_output=True,
            text=True
        )
        
        print(f"Command execution completed, exit code: {result.returncode}")
        
        if result.stdout:
            print(f"Standard output:\n{result.stdout}")
        if result.stderr:
            print(f"Error output:\n{result.stderr}")
        
        if os.path.exists("/home/openclaw"):
            print("\nDetected OpenClaw installed in /home/openclaw")
            subprocess.run("ln -sf /home/openclaw/.nvm/versions/node/v22.22.1/bin/node /usr/local/bin/node", shell=True)
            subprocess.run("ln -sf /home/openclaw/.nvm/versions/node/v22.22.1/bin/npm /usr/local/bin/npm", shell=True)
            cmd_name = "/home/openclaw/.local/share/pnpm/openclaw"
            restart_cmd = f"sudo -i -u openclaw env DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS=unix:path=/run/user/1000/bus {cmd_name} gateway restart >> /var/manage_operate.log 2>&1"
            subprocess.run(restart_cmd, shell=True)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The constant command does not demonstrate parameter abuse, but it exposes a global npm entry point backed by the application user's runtime tree. If that tree is user-writable, an application-account attacker can replace code later run by a privileged npm consumer.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/lib.py (reported line 1275)May include surrounding context.

python
print(f"Command execution completed, exit code: {result.returncode}")
        
        if result.stdout:
            print(f"Standard output:\n{result.stdout}")
        if result.stderr:
            print(f"Error output:\n{result.stderr}")
        
        if os.path.exists("/home/openclaw"):
            print("\nDetected OpenClaw installed in /home/openclaw")
            subprocess.run("ln -sf /home/openclaw/.nvm/versions/node/v22.22.1/bin/node /usr/local/bin/node", shell=True)
            subprocess.run("ln -sf /home/openclaw/.nvm/versions/node/v22.22.1/bin/npm /usr/local/bin/npm", shell=True)
            cmd_name = "/home/openclaw/.local/share/pnpm/openclaw"
            restart_cmd = f"sudo -i -u openclaw env DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS=unix:path=/run/user/1000/bus {cmd_name} gateway restart >> /var/manage_operate.log 2>&1"
            subprocess.run(restart_cmd, shell=True)
            status_cmd = f"sudo -i -u openclaw env DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS=unix:path=/run/user/1000/bus {cmd_name} gate

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/lib.py (reported line 1278)May include surrounding context.

python
talled in /home/openclaw")
            subprocess.run("ln -sf /home/openclaw/.nvm/versions/node/v22.22.1/bin/node /usr/local/bin/node", shell=True)
            subprocess.run("ln -sf /home/openclaw/.nvm/versions/node/v22.22.1/bin/npm /usr/local/bin/npm", shell=True)
            cmd_name = "/home/openclaw/.local/share/pnpm/openclaw"
            restart_cmd = f"sudo -i -u openclaw env DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS=unix:path=/run/user/1000/bus {cmd_name} gateway restart >> /var/manage_operate.log 2>&1"
            subprocess.run(restart_cmd, shell=True)
            status_cmd = f"sudo -i -u openclaw env DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS=unix:path=/run/user/1000/bus {cmd_name} gateway status 2>&1"
            status_result = subprocess.run(status_cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True)
            print(f"Gateway status:\n{status_result.stdout}")
            
        elif os.path.exists("/root/.local/share/pnpm/openclaw"):
            print("\nDetected OpenClaw installed in /root")
            subprocess.run("ln -sf /

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/lib.py (reported line 1372)May include surrounding context.

python
talled in /home/openclaw")
            subprocess.run("ln -sf /home/openclaw/.nvm/versions/node/v22.22.1/bin/node /usr/local/bin/node", shell=True)
            subprocess.run("ln -sf /home/openclaw/.nvm/versions/node/v22.22.1/bin/npm /usr/local/bin/npm", shell=True)
            cmd_name = "/home/openclaw/.local/share/pnpm/openclaw"
            restart_cmd = f"sudo -i -u openclaw env DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS=unix:path=/run/user/1000/bus {cmd_name} gateway restart >> /var/manage_operate.log 2>&1"
            subprocess.run(restart_cmd, shell=True)
            status_cmd = f"sudo -i -u openclaw env DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS=unix:path=/run/user/1000/bus {cmd_name} gateway status 2>&1"
            status_result = subprocess.run(status_cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True)
            print(f"Gateway status:\n{status_result.stdout}")
            
        elif os.path.exists("/root/.local/share/pnpm/openclaw"):
            print("\nDetected OpenClaw installed in /root")
            subprocess.run("ln -sf /

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/lib.py (reported line 1280)May include surrounding context.

python
rsions/node/v22.22.1/bin/npm /usr/local/bin/npm", shell=True)
            cmd_name = "/home/openclaw/.local/share/pnpm/openclaw"
            restart_cmd = f"sudo -i -u openclaw env DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS=unix:path=/run/user/1000/bus {cmd_name} gateway restart >> /var/manage_operate.log 2>&1"
            subprocess.run(restart_cmd, shell=True)
            status_cmd = f"sudo -i -u openclaw env DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS=unix:path=/run/user/1000/bus {cmd_name} gateway status 2>&1"
            status_result = subprocess.run(status_cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True)
            print(f"Gateway status:\n{status_result.stdout}")
            
        elif os.path.exists("/root/.local/share/pnpm/openclaw"):
            print("\nDetected OpenClaw installed in /root")
            subprocess.run("ln -sf /root/.nvm/versions/node/v22.22.0/bin/node /usr/local/bin/node", shell=True)
            subprocess.run("ln -sf /root/.nvm/versions/node/v22.22.0/bin/npm /usr/local/bin/npm", shell=True)
            cmd_nam

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/lib.py (reported line 1374)May include surrounding context.

python
rsions/node/v22.22.1/bin/npm /usr/local/bin/npm", shell=True)
            cmd_name = "/home/openclaw/.local/share/pnpm/openclaw"
            restart_cmd = f"sudo -i -u openclaw env DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS=unix:path=/run/user/1000/bus {cmd_name} gateway restart >> /var/manage_operate.log 2>&1"
            subprocess.run(restart_cmd, shell=True)
            status_cmd = f"sudo -i -u openclaw env DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS=unix:path=/run/user/1000/bus {cmd_name} gateway status 2>&1"
            status_result = subprocess.run(status_cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True)
            print(f"Gateway status:\n{status_result.stdout}")
            
        elif os.path.exists("/root/.local/share/pnpm/openclaw"):
            print("\nDetected OpenClaw installed in /root")
            subprocess.run("ln -sf /root/.nvm/versions/node/v22.22.0/bin/node /usr/local/bin/node", shell=True)
            subprocess.run("ln -sf /root/.nvm/versions/node/v22.22.0/bin/npm /usr/local/bin/npm", shell=True)
            cmd_nam

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/lib.py (reported line 1285)May include surrounding context.

python
e.log 2>&1"
            subprocess.run(restart_cmd, shell=True)
            status_cmd = f"sudo -i -u openclaw env DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS=unix:path=/run/user/1000/bus {cmd_name} gateway status 2>&1"
            status_result = subprocess.run(status_cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True)
            print(f"Gateway status:\n{status_result.stdout}")
            
        elif os.path.exists("/root/.local/share/pnpm/openclaw"):
            print("\nDetected OpenClaw installed in /root")
            subprocess.run("ln -sf /root/.nvm/versions/node/v22.22.0/bin/node /usr/local/bin/node", shell=True)
            subprocess.run("ln -sf /root/.nvm/versions/node/v22.22.0/bin/npm /usr/local/bin/npm", shell=True)
            cmd_name = "/root/.local/share/pnpm/openclaw"
            subprocess.run(f"{cmd_name} gateway restart >> /var/manage_operate.log 2>&1", shell=True)
            status_result = subprocess.run(f"{cmd_name} gateway status 2>&1", shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True)
            print(f"

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/lib.py (reported line 1379)May include surrounding context.

python
e.log 2>&1"
            subprocess.run(restart_cmd, shell=True)
            status_cmd = f"sudo -i -u openclaw env DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS=unix:path=/run/user/1000/bus {cmd_name} gateway status 2>&1"
            status_result = subprocess.run(status_cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True)
            print(f"Gateway status:\n{status_result.stdout}")
            
        elif os.path.exists("/root/.local/share/pnpm/openclaw"):
            print("\nDetected OpenClaw installed in /root")
            subprocess.run("ln -sf /root/.nvm/versions/node/v22.22.0/bin/node /usr/local/bin/node", shell=True)
            subprocess.run("ln -sf /root/.nvm/versions/node/v22.22.0/bin/npm /usr/local/bin/npm", shell=True)
            cmd_name = "/root/.local/share/pnpm/openclaw"
            subprocess.run(f"{cmd_name} gateway restart >> /var/manage_operate.log 2>&1", shell=True)
            status_result = subprocess.run(f"{cmd_name} gateway status 2>&1", shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True)
            print(f"

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/lib.py (reported line 1286)May include surrounding context.

python
nv DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS=unix:path=/run/user/1000/bus {cmd_name} gateway status 2>&1"
            status_result = subprocess.run(status_cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True)
            print(f"Gateway status:\n{status_result.stdout}")
            
        elif os.path.exists("/root/.local/share/pnpm/openclaw"):
            print("\nDetected OpenClaw installed in /root")
            subprocess.run("ln -sf /root/.nvm/versions/node/v22.22.0/bin/node /usr/local/bin/node", shell=True)
            subprocess.run("ln -sf /root/.nvm/versions/node/v22.22.0/bin/npm /usr/local/bin/npm", shell=True)
            cmd_name = "/root/.local/share/pnpm/openclaw"
            subprocess.run(f"{cmd_name} gateway restart >> /var/manage_operate.log 2>&1", shell=True)
            status_result = subprocess.run(f"{cmd_name} gateway status 2>&1", shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True)
            print(f"Gateway status:\n{status_result.stdout}")
        
        if result.returncode == 0:
            return {

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/lib.py (reported line 1380)May include surrounding context.

python
nv DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS=unix:path=/run/user/1000/bus {cmd_name} gateway status 2>&1"
            status_result = subprocess.run(status_cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True)
            print(f"Gateway status:\n{status_result.stdout}")
            
        elif os.path.exists("/root/.local/share/pnpm/openclaw"):
            print("\nDetected OpenClaw installed in /root")
            subprocess.run("ln -sf /root/.nvm/versions/node/v22.22.0/bin/node /usr/local/bin/node", shell=True)
            subprocess.run("ln -sf /root/.nvm/versions/node/v22.22.0/bin/npm /usr/local/bin/npm", shell=True)
            cmd_name = "/root/.local/share/pnpm/openclaw"
            subprocess.run(f"{cmd_name} gateway restart >> /var/manage_operate.log 2>&1", shell=True)
            status_result = subprocess.run(f"{cmd_name} gateway status 2>&1", shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True)
            print(f"Gateway status:\n{status_result.stdout}")
        
        if result.returncode == 0:
            return {

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/lib.py (reported line 1288)May include surrounding context.

python
ut=True, text=True)
            print(f"Gateway status:\n{status_result.stdout}")
            
        elif os.path.exists("/root/.local/share/pnpm/openclaw"):
            print("\nDetected OpenClaw installed in /root")
            subprocess.run("ln -sf /root/.nvm/versions/node/v22.22.0/bin/node /usr/local/bin/node", shell=True)
            subprocess.run("ln -sf /root/.nvm/versions/node/v22.22.0/bin/npm /usr/local/bin/npm", shell=True)
            cmd_name = "/root/.local/share/pnpm/openclaw"
            subprocess.run(f"{cmd_name} gateway restart >> /var/manage_operate.log 2>&1", shell=True)
            status_result = subprocess.run(f"{cmd_name} gateway status 2>&1", shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True)
            print(f"Gateway status:\n{status_result.stdout}")
        
        if result.returncode == 0:
            return {
                "ok": True,
                "text": "Model installation completed",
                "result": {
                    "stdout": result.stdout,

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/lib.py (reported line 1382)May include surrounding context.

python
ut=True, text=True)
            print(f"Gateway status:\n{status_result.stdout}")
            
        elif os.path.exists("/root/.local/share/pnpm/openclaw"):
            print("\nDetected OpenClaw installed in /root")
            subprocess.run("ln -sf /root/.nvm/versions/node/v22.22.0/bin/node /usr/local/bin/node", shell=True)
            subprocess.run("ln -sf /root/.nvm/versions/node/v22.22.0/bin/npm /usr/local/bin/npm", shell=True)
            cmd_name = "/root/.local/share/pnpm/openclaw"
            subprocess.run(f"{cmd_name} gateway restart >> /var/manage_operate.log 2>&1", shell=True)
            status_result = subprocess.run(f"{cmd_name} gateway status 2>&1", shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True)
            print(f"Gateway status:\n{status_result.stdout}")
        
        if result.returncode == 0:
            return {
                "ok": True,
                "text": "Channel installation completed",
                "result": {
                    "stdout": result.stdout,

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/lib.py (reported line 1289)May include surrounding context.

python
ists("/root/.local/share/pnpm/openclaw"):
            print("\nDetected OpenClaw installed in /root")
            subprocess.run("ln -sf /root/.nvm/versions/node/v22.22.0/bin/node /usr/local/bin/node", shell=True)
            subprocess.run("ln -sf /root/.nvm/versions/node/v22.22.0/bin/npm /usr/local/bin/npm", shell=True)
            cmd_name = "/root/.local/share/pnpm/openclaw"
            subprocess.run(f"{cmd_name} gateway restart >> /var/manage_operate.log 2>&1", shell=True)
            status_result = subprocess.run(f"{cmd_name} gateway status 2>&1", shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True)
            print(f"Gateway status:\n{status_result.stdout}")
        
        if result.returncode == 0:
            return {
                "ok": True,
                "text": "Model installation completed",
                "result": {
                    "stdout": result.stdout,
                    "stderr": result.stderr,
                    "returncode": result.returncode
                },
                "e

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/lib.py (reported line 1383)May include surrounding context.

python
ists("/root/.local/share/pnpm/openclaw"):
            print("\nDetected OpenClaw installed in /root")
            subprocess.run("ln -sf /root/.nvm/versions/node/v22.22.0/bin/node /usr/local/bin/node", shell=True)
            subprocess.run("ln -sf /root/.nvm/versions/node/v22.22.0/bin/npm /usr/local/bin/npm", shell=True)
            cmd_name = "/root/.local/share/pnpm/openclaw"
            subprocess.run(f"{cmd_name} gateway restart >> /var/manage_operate.log 2>&1", shell=True)
            status_result = subprocess.run(f"{cmd_name} gateway status 2>&1", shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True)
            print(f"Gateway status:\n{status_result.stdout}")
        
        if result.returncode == 0:
            return {
                "ok": True,
                "text": "Channel installation completed",
                "result": {
                    "stdout": result.stdout,
                    "stderr": result.stderr,
                    "returncode": result.returncode
                },

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

This duplicates the channel installer's global node symlink vulnerability, rather than demonstrating parameter injection. A writable runtime beneath the openclaw home directory can become a code-execution path for higher-privileged users invoking the global node command.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/lib.py (reported line 1368)May include surrounding context.

python
cess.run(
            ["bash", "-c", install_command],
            capture_output=True,
            text=True
        )
        
        print(f"Command execution completed, exit code: {result.returncode}")
        
        if result.stdout:
            print(f"Standard output:\n{result.stdout}")
        if result.stderr:
            print(f"Error output:\n{result.stderr}")
        
        if os.path.exists("/home/openclaw"):
            print("\nDetected OpenClaw installed in /home/openclaw")
            subprocess.run("ln -sf /home/openclaw/.nvm/versions/node/v22.22.1/bin/node /usr/local/bin/node", shell=True)
            subprocess.run("ln -sf /home/openclaw/.nvm/versions/node/v22.22.1/bin/npm /usr/local/bin/npm", shell=True)
            cmd_name = "/home/openclaw/.local/share/pnpm/openclaw"
            restart_cmd = f"sudo -i -u openclaw env DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS=unix:path=/run/user/1000/bus {cmd_name} gateway restart >> /var/manage_operate.log 2>&1"
            subprocess.run(restart_cmd, shell=True)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

This duplicates the unsafe global npm symlink in the channel installation path. Although all command arguments are fixed, a compromised application account could modify the linked installation and influence subsequent privileged npm executions.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/lib.py (reported line 1369)May include surrounding context.

python
print(f"Command execution completed, exit code: {result.returncode}")
        
        if result.stdout:
            print(f"Standard output:\n{result.stdout}")
        if result.stderr:
            print(f"Error output:\n{result.stderr}")
        
        if os.path.exists("/home/openclaw"):
            print("\nDetected OpenClaw installed in /home/openclaw")
            subprocess.run("ln -sf /home/openclaw/.nvm/versions/node/v22.22.1/bin/node /usr/local/bin/node", shell=True)
            subprocess.run("ln -sf /home/openclaw/.nvm/versions/node/v22.22.1/bin/npm /usr/local/bin/npm", shell=True)
            cmd_name = "/home/openclaw/.local/share/pnpm/openclaw"
            restart_cmd = f"sudo -i -u openclaw env DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS=unix:path=/run/user/1000/bus {cmd_name} gateway restart >> /var/manage_operate.log 2>&1"
            subprocess.run(restart_cmd, shell=True)
            status_cmd = f"sudo -i -u openclaw env DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS=unix:path=/run/user/1000/bus {cmd_name} gate

Chaining Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/userdata/multi-agent.sh (reported line 14)May include surrounding context.

sh
# 检查 jq 是否安装
if ! command -v jq &>/dev/null; then
    echo "Installing jq..."
    sudo apt-get update -qq && sudo apt-get install -y -qq jq 2>/dev/null ||
        sudo yum install -y -q jq 2>/dev/null
    if ! command -v jq &>/dev/null; then
        echo "Error: Failed to install jq! Please install jq manually."

Chaining Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/userdata/multi_channel.sh (reported line 5)May include surrounding context.

sh
# 1. Silent jq check
if ! command -v jq &>/dev/null; then
    sudo apt-get update -qq && sudo apt-get install -y -qq jq 2>/dev/null ||
        sudo yum install -y -q jq 2>/dev/null
fi

Chaining Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/userdata/multi_model.sh (reported line 9)May include surrounding context.

sh
# 1. Silent jq check
if ! command -v jq &>/dev/null; then
    sudo apt-get update -qq && sudo apt-get install -y -qq jq 2>/dev/null ||
        sudo yum install -y -q jq 2>/dev/null
fi

Chaining Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/userdata/multi-agent.sh (reported line 14)May include surrounding context.

sh
# 检查 jq 是否安装
if ! command -v jq &>/dev/null; then
    echo "Installing jq..."
    sudo apt-get update -qq && sudo apt-get install -y -qq jq 2>/dev/null ||
        sudo yum install -y -q jq 2>/dev/null
    if ! command -v jq &>/dev/null; then
        echo "Error: Failed to install jq! Please install jq manually."

Chaining Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/userdata/multi_channel.sh (reported line 5)May include surrounding context.

sh
# 1. Silent jq check
if ! command -v jq &>/dev/null; then
    sudo apt-get update -qq && sudo apt-get install -y -qq jq 2>/dev/null ||
        sudo yum install -y -q jq 2>/dev/null
fi