Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This auditor needs review because its collector can execute untrusted programs as root and leaves broad cloud permissions active after scanning.
Request a corrected collector before production use: it must avoid executing untrusted binaries as root. Have an administrator review the agency's permissions and lifetime; normal cleanup does not revoke them. Confirm that software-name queries and inventory logging are acceptable, verify the CLI installer, and treat the report as a limited assessment.
scripts/collect_assets.shRoot inventory collector executes lower-privileged users' listening-process binaries
An attacker-controlled listener can execute arbitrary code as root when audited, enabling access to protected files, system modification, or persistence. The two-second timeout and exception handling do not prevent immediate privileged side effects.
The all-project role-assignment operation changes account authorization beyond the individual ECS target. This is the same underlying excessive-delegation issue as the other TP4 finding, rather than an additional independent vulnerability; the legitimate audit purpose does not justify unrestricted project coverage.
The workflow creates a permanent service-trust agency and grants roles across all projects, leaving authorization changes in place after the audit. Although IAM setup is disclosed in the workflow and may be needed for COC, its persistent, account-wide scope unnecessarily increases the blast radius of misuse or compromise of the delegated service execution path.
A routine audit can establish permanent, all-project service delegation without a separate approval checkpoint or a clear explanation that cleanup does not revoke those permissions. Calling this one-time setup discloses the operation but does not adequately distinguish its lasting security consequences from temporary inventory collection.
The prescribed role set includes DCS UserAccess even though the stated inventory target is ECS hosts and their workloads, and the workflow binds every role across all projects. No task-specific justification is provided for DCS access, so this broadens the agency's authority beyond the demonstrated need and compounds the persistent-delegation risk.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
1. **Create Collector Script**: Register `scripts/collect_assets.sh` as a temporary COC shell script via `COC CreateScript`.
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
php_out = subprocess.check_output(["php", "-v"], stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, timeout=3).decode("utf-8", "ignore")
m = re.search(r'PHP[ ]+([0-9]+[.][0-9]+[.][0-9]+)', php_out)
if m:
lang_pkgs["php"].append({"name": "php", "version": m.group(1)})
except Exception:
pass
inventory["language_packages"] = lang_pkgs
# 4. Containers
containers_info = {"runtimes": "", "running_containers": [], "images": []}
runtimes = []
for rt in ["docker", "podman", "nerdctl", "crictl"]:
try:
subprocess.check_call(["command", "-v", rt], shell=True, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)
runtimes.append(rt)
except Exception:
pass
containers_info["runtimes"] = ",".join(runtimes)
if "docker" in runtimes:
try:
docker_fmt = "{{.ID}}" + chr(9) + "{{.Image}}" + chr(9) + "{{.Names}}" + chr(9) + "{{.Status}}" + chr(9) + "{{.Ports}}"
dps = subprocess.check_output(["docker", "ps", "--format", docker_fmt], stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, timeout=5).decode("
Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.
Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.
5. **Vulnerability & KEV Matching** — Cross-reference identified assets against `https://db.gcve.eu/api/` (`/vulnerability/?product={product}` for product CVEs, `/kev` for confirmed in-the-wild exploitation, and `/epss` for exploit prediction scoring).
6. **Automatic Version Range Matching & CVSS Fallback** — Automatically evaluate whether the installed version falls within the CVE's affected version range (e.g. `8.3.* to <8.3.36`), extract CVSS scores with graceful fallback policies, and extract official vulnerability disclosure dates.
7. **Remediation Report Generation** — Output prioritized remediation guidance (P0 KEV criticals, package upgrade commands, container base image updates, network security group rules).
8. **Security Cleanup** — Automatically remove temporary COC scripts and remote scan artifacts.
**Tool chain:** Huawei Cloud KooCLI (`hcloud`) + Python 3 + `https://db.gcve.eu/api/`.
The workflow audits all discovered components by default and places their product names in requests to db.gcve.eu. Although the API calls are documented, there is no warning that this discloses information about the target's software inventory to an external service.
This acceptance criterion explicitly mandates English for all documentation, allowing only Chinese trigger keywords as an exception. It provides neither a user language choice nor a documented justification for the language restriction.
The Linux and macOS instructions execute a downloaded, mutable 'latest' installer without verifying its signature or integrity, while automatic confirmation reduces the opportunity to review installation changes. HTTPS and the apparent Huawei-hosted source reduce interception concerns, but a compromised distribution source could still execute arbitrary code with the invoking user's permissions; subsequent cloud credential configuration increases the potential consequences.
The setup directs users to bind every listed role to a COC service agency across all projects, with the agency configured to last forever, without warning about persistent access or requiring explicit approval of that scope. This can extend remote-execution capabilities and other service permissions beyond the intended audit targets, increasing the blast radius if an attacker gains the ability to abuse COC execution. A vulnerability auditor legitimately needs some remote access, but that purpose does not establish a need for permanent, account-wide grants or the listed DCS permissions.
Without a product filter, the script silently restricts OS package checks to a hard-coded name allowlist despite advertising an audit of all discovered components. In a vulnerability-auditing tool, this coverage gap can leave vulnerable packages unexamined while producing a report that users may mistake for a comprehensive assessment; it does not directly compromise the host.
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
lines.append("### 1. Host OS Packages")
os_name = sys_info.get("os_name", "").lower()
if "ubuntu" in os_name or "debian" in os_name:
lines.append("```bash\nsudo apt-get update\nsudo apt-get --only-upgrade install <package_name>\n```")
else:
lines.append("```bash\nsudo yum update-minimal --security -y\n```")
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
lines.append("### 1. Host OS Packages")
os_name = sys_info.get("os_name", "").lower()
if "ubuntu" in os_name or "debian" in os_name:
lines.append("```bash\nsudo apt-get update\nsudo apt-get --only-upgrade install <package_name>\n```")
else:
lines.append("```bash\nsudo yum update-minimal --security -y\n```")
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
if "ubuntu" in os_name or "debian" in os_name:
lines.append("```bash\nsudo apt-get update\nsudo apt-get --only-upgrade install <package_name>\n```")
else:
lines.append("```bash\nsudo yum update-minimal --security -y\n```")
lines.append("")
lines.append("### 2. Network & Application Services")
No suspicious patterns detected.