Ae1
- Category
- analysis-evasion
- Confidence
- 100% confidence
- Finding
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- Content
md - [Client Config Reference](references/client-config-catalog.md) — client_config.yaml field mapping, Zenoh QoS settings
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill matches its stated robot-to-cloud purpose, but it can control real robot hardware and transmit telemetry with credentials, so users should review safety and privacy controls before installing.
Install only if you intend to operate a CloudRobo R2C edge client. Use non-production credentials first, keep the credential bundle and private key password protected, start with dummy hardware or dry_run, confirm dry_run still sends observations, clear the robot workspace before live execution, keep an emergency stop available, and install custom adapters only from trusted code.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- [Client Config Reference](references/client-config-catalog.md) — client_config.yaml field mapping, Zenoh QoS settings
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
--log-level INFO 2>&1 || true
if [ -f /tmp/r2c_test_observations.pkl ]; then
echo " Recording file created: $(ls -la /tmp/r2c_test_observations.pkl)"
rm -f /tmp/r2c_test_observations.pkl
else
echo " Warning: recording file not created"
fi
The guide documents the contents of the credential bundle, including a private key and device identity metadata, but does not prominently warn users that the zip file and extracted files are highly sensitive secrets. In this R2C/mTLS context, disclosure of server_key.pem or the full bundle could enable impersonation of the robot client or unauthorized access to the data plane.
Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.
cloudrobo r2c client --bundle ./cert.zip --private-key-password
cloudrobo r2c client --bundle ./cert.zip --no-prompt-password
The instructions tell users to place long-lived Huawei Cloud AK/SK credentials into environment variables without accompanying guidance on secure handling. While environment variables are common, documenting this pattern without warnings can lead to credential exposure through shell history, process inspection, shared environments, CI logs, or accidental persistence in profile files.
This markdown file explains that observations, joint states, localization, IMU data, heartbeats, and action traffic are published over cloud-connected topics, but it does not include a user-facing warning that these fields may expose operational or sensitive device data. Under the markdown-specific SQP-2 criteria, descriptions of behaviors affecting user data or privacy should disclose those impacts clearly.
The guide documents keyboard bindings that can trigger robot commands like go_home, but it does not place an explicit safety warning near the example to highlight that a key press can cause immediate physical actuation. In a robot-control context, omission of that warning increases the chance of accidental motion, unsafe testing, or operator misuse around live hardware.
The dry-run section tells users to disable dry_run and verify the robot moves correctly, but it does not include a strong safety notice before transitioning from simulated/log-only behavior to real actuator execution. Because this skill directly controls robots, that omission can lead users to run test actions on live hardware without confirming workspace clearance, limits, supervision, or emergency stop readiness.
The dry-run section explicitly shows that real hardware observations are still collected and published to Zenoh/cloud while only action execution is suppressed, but it does not prominently warn users about the resulting data exposure. This can mislead operators into believing dry-run is fully non-invasive, causing unintended transmission of potentially sensitive telemetry, sensor data, or robot state to external systems.
This markdown explains that the runtime can run forever, execute received actions when dry_run is false, and enable keyboard-triggered commands like go_home, but it does not include an explicit safety warning about affecting connected robot hardware or requiring operator caution. For a robotics configuration reference, these behaviors can impact system integrity and physical devices, so the documentation should visibly disclose that actions may move hardware unless dry-run is enabled.
The documentation instructs users to record robot observations to a local .pkl file but does not warn that observation data may contain sensitive operational, environmental, or proprietary information. This can lead to unintentional data retention or insecure storage, and the use of pickle also carries downstream risk if such files are later loaded from untrusted sources.
This manifest includes commands that use credential bundles, connect a robot-side client to cloud infrastructure, load custom hardware classes, and write logs/recordings, but it does not pair them with explicit safety warnings or execution constraints. In a skill that drives a networked robot edge client, this can lead users or automation to run tests with real credentials, real cloud connections, and potentially real hardware effects without understanding the operational risk.
This JSON manifest repeatedly labels cases as "type": "write" or "read" but does not define what conditions cause these tests to be selected or excluded. In a manifest file, vague scope markers without explicit constraints can lead to overly broad or unintended invocation behavior by downstream tooling.
No suspicious patterns detected.