Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill needs review because its test client can disclose images outside the chosen folder, and its server has avoidable exposure and resource-exhaustion risks.
Use only in an isolated test environment until these issues are addressed. Constrain image paths to the selected directory, validate camera names, and verify the server certificate before sending real images. Restrict server access, enforce finite message and array limits, and return sanitized errors. The review covered every bundled file; user-supplied model code and actual deployment protections remain unverified.
scripts/test_client.pyServer-controlled image keys escape the selected image directory and disclose local images
Readable JPEG or PNG images outside the authorized directory can be disclosed as resized RGB pixels. This does not establish arbitrary non-image file disclosure.
references/server_template.pyUnauthenticated network clients can exhaust server memory through unlimited WebSocket messages
Oversized messages can exhaust process memory and interrupt inference service for legitimate clients. Malformed observations need not pass model validation because buffering occurs first.
Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.
The skill mandates returning full exception tracebacks to remote clients, which can disclose filesystem paths, implementation details, and sensitive values included in exception messages. Malformed inference requests can trigger these disclosures; making this behavior a reusable protocol requirement spreads the weakness beyond local debugging.
Setting max_size=None removes the WebSocket message-size ceiling, allowing a reachable client to submit oversized payloads that exhaust memory or processing capacity. Large image arrays justify a higher limit, not unlimited input, and copying this setting into inference deployments can disrupt an expensive shared service.
Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.
f"class '{class_name}' not found in {adapter_path}. "
f"available: {[k for k in dir(mod) if not k.startswith('_')]}"
)
return getattr(mod, class_name)
def verify_obs_conversion(adapter_class, constructor_kwargs=None,