Incomplete referenced artifact analysis
- Category
- analysis-evasion
- Confidence
- 100% confidence
- Finding
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- Content
md - **纯 Node.js 脚本**:`submit.mjs`(Node ≥ 18,无外部依赖),不使用 KooCLI。
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill submits challenge results as described, but its cleanup workflow permits cloud-resource deletion without requiring confirmation of the exact resources.
Use short-lived, minimally privileged credentials and understand that the submission service receives the secret key over HTTPS. Skip cleanup unless you can approve the exact resources to delete. Review and pin the optional gallery installer and skill before use, keep cloud credentials out of that installation environment, and check which code will be published. Replace the key-printing check with a presence-only check.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- **纯 Node.js 脚本**:`submit.mjs`(Node ≥ 18,无外部依赖),不使用 KooCLI。
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
4. **执行提交**:运行 `submit.mjs`(见下)。参数与步骤字段对应(**两步均需 `--project-id` 与 `--region`**;本 skill 固定使用生产环境接口)。
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
脚本位于本 skill 目录:`submit.mjs`(纯 Node,Node ≥ 18,无需额外依赖)。
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- **Node.js ≥ 18**:本 skill 的提交脚本 `submit.mjs` 使用原生 `fetch()`,需 Node 18 或以上版本。
Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.
The manifest references the same unpinned installer used by the optional publication workflow, so this duplicates the supply-chain issue rather than identifying a separate vulnerability. The MCP classification is inaccurate, but executing a mutable npm package and trusting a mutable remote skill can compromise the agent's local execution context.
The description references an installation workflow that later invokes an unpinned npm executable and retrieves a skill from an unpinned Git repository. This is not an MCP-server configuration as the detector claims, but the underlying supply-chain risk is real: compromised upstream content could execute code or introduce adversarial instructions in an environment holding cloud credentials.
The manifest describes submitting activity results and optionally publishing work to the gallery, but L102 instructs the agent to execute cleanup of billable cloud resources, including deleting ECS instances, after user selection. This introduces destructive cloud-resource management beyond the declared submission scope; requiring user consent reduces risk but does not resolve the scope mismatch.
The executable command uses npx skills add without an exact installer version and fetches a Git repository without an immutable revision. User approval to publish reduces unintended execution but does not protect against an upstream compromise that could expose local source code or credentials.
This reference points to the same unpinned installation workflow rather than a separate MCP server or additional execution path. Its security relevance comes from the actionable command elsewhere in the document, which permits mutable upstream code and skill instructions to enter a credential-bearing workflow.
The recommended echo $HW_ACCESS_KEY check unnecessarily exposes the access-key identifier to terminal output, which may be retained in agent transcripts, CI logs, or shared debugging records. Because this skill uses production credentials, disclosure should be avoided; however, the AK alone normally cannot authenticate requests without the corresponding SK, so this is a limited information-disclosure issue rather than a complete credential compromise.
Overly Broad Trigger: description clause 'publish-work-to-gallery)。Use when the user asks to 提交作品、提交闯关成果、自动提交活动成果、提交沙箱链接/公网地址, or when a generated sandbox URL needs to be submitted for the 华为云开放能力闯关挑战。本 skill' activates on 'to', which is too short and may match unintended inputs
Detected: suspicious.env_credential_access