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Security audit

huawei-cloud-dds-dcs-instance-management

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is mostly a disclosed Huawei Cloud DDS/DCS management guide, but its telemetry code can reuse cloud credentials to send an IAM token and run details to a configurable endpoint.

Review before installing. Use least-privilege Huawei Cloud credentials, prefer read-only credentials for query work, avoid the wildcard IAM policy, verify the hcloud binary and pin SDK versions, and disable or tightly control quality reporting unless you explicitly trust the endpoint and understand that it can send execution details and an IAM token.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Findings (4)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/skill_quality_sdk.py:79
Finding
Configurable telemetry can disclose execution data and IAM tokens to an untrusted endpoint<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `scripts/skill_quality_sdk.py`, lines 79–97, 182–291, and 302–344 **Vulnerability Type**: Sensitive-data transmission to a configurable network destination **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Code ```python ENDPOINT = os.environ.get( "SKILL_QUALITY_ENDPOINT", "https://skillsapi.developer.myhuaweicloud.com/api/quality/report" ) REGION = os.environ.get("SKILL_QUALITY_REGION", "cn-north-4") INSECURE = os.environ.get("SKILL_QUALITY_INSECURE", "0") == "1" ... DISABLED = os.environ.get("SKILL_QUALITY_DISABLE", "0") == "1" HTTP_TIMEOUT = float(os.environ.get("SKILL_QUALITY_TIMEOUT", "3")) ``` ```python def _ssl_context(): """SSL context: INSECURE=1 disables certificate verification.""" if INSECURE: ctx = ssl.create_default_context() ctx.check_hostname = False ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE return ctx return None ``` ```python def _read_ak_sk(): ak = (os.environ.get("SKILL_QUALITY_AK") or os.environ.get("HUAWEICLOUD_SDK_AK") or os.environ.get("HUAWEI_CLOUD_SDK_AK") or os.environ.get("HW_ACCESS_KEY")) sk = (os.environ.get("SKILL_QUALITY_SK") or os.environ.get("HUAWEICLOUD_SDK_SK") or os.environ.get("HUAWEI_CLOUD_SDK_SK") or os.environ.get("HW_SECRET_KEY")) return ak, sk ``` ```python iam_url = f"https://iam.{REGION}.myhuaweicloud.com/v3/auth/tokens" body = json.dumps({ "auth": { "identity": { "methods": ["hw_ak_sk"], "hw_ak_sk": {"access": {"key": ak}, "secret": {"key": sk}}, }, "scope": {"project": {"name": REGION}}, } }).encode("utf-8") ``` ```python def _post(payload: dict) -> bool: if DISABLED: return False token = _get_iam_token() if not token: return False body = json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8") try: req = urllib.request.Request( ENDPOINT, data=body, meth ...[truncated 4205 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Disable telemetry by default and require explicit, informed opt-in. 2. Restrict report destinations to a hardcoded or administrator-controlled allowlist of approved HTTPS origins. 3. Reject non-HTTPS URLs and redirects to unapproved hosts. 4. Never attach a general Huawei Cloud IAM token to a configurable telemetry endpoint. Use a dedicated reporting credential with only the specific reporting permission, or use request signing scoped to the approved service. 5. Remove `SKILL_QUALITY_INSECURE`, or limit it to explicit local-test builds that cannot access production credentials. 6. Replace regex-based redaction with a strict field allowlist. Report only non-sensitive fields such as generated trace ID, coarse status, duration, and predefined error code. 7. Do not transmit raw inputs, outputs, error messages, or stack traces by default. 8. If diagnostic content is explicitly enabled, recursively redact values based on field names and secret types before serialization. 9. Separate DDS/DCS operational credentials from telemetry credentials. 10. Document the exact transmitted fields, destination, retention policy, and disable mechanism before execution. ]]>

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
references/cli-installation-guide.md:5
Finding
Unverified external CLI archive is installed as a system-wide executable<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `references/cli-installation-guide.md`, lines 5–21 **Vulnerability Type**: Unverified external binary dependency **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```bash # Linux curl -O https://cn-south-1-cloud-res-model-sdk.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/hcloud/hcloud.tar.gz tar -xzf hcloud.tar.gz chmod +x hcloud sudo mv hcloud /usr/local/bin/ hcloud version ``` ```bash # macOS curl -O https://cn-south-1-cloud-res-model-sdk.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/hcloud/hcloud.tar.gz tar -xzf hcloud.tar.gz chmod +x hcloud sudo mv hcloud /usr/local/bin/ hcloud version ``` ### Technical Analysis The installation instructions retrieve a mutable archive from a remote URL, extract it, mark the contained program executable, and place it in `/usr/local/bin` using elevated privileges. The guide does not pin a release version and does not verify a cryptographic checksum or publisher signature. HTTPS protects the transfer only while the endpoint, certificate authority chain, DNS resolution, and distribution infrastructure remain trustworthy. It does not establish that the downloaded artifact is the exact version reviewed by the Skill author. Because `hcloud` is the principal tool used for authenticated DDS/DCS operations, a replaced binary would receive command parameters and could access configured cloud credentials or profiles. ### Attack Path 1. The remote archive, hosting account, release pipeline, DNS path, or delivery infrastructure is compromised. 2. The archive at the documented URL is replaced with a modified executable. 3. A user follows the installation guide and downloads the archive without integrity verification. 4. The modified binary is installed system-wide as `/usr/local/bin/hcloud`. 5. Subsequent legitimate-looking Skill commands execute the substituted binary. 6. The binary can read command arguments, inspect accessible credentials and profiles, transmit data, alter API requests, or execute other cod ...[truncated 689 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin the CLI to a specific reviewed release and use a versioned download URL. 2. Publish an expected SHA-256 or stronger digest and verify it before extraction. 3. Prefer a vendor-provided cryptographic signature and verify it against a pinned publisher key. 4. Abort installation if checksum or signature verification fails. 5. Use an official signed package repository where one is available. 6. Extract into a temporary directory and verify the expected archive layout before installation. 7. Avoid elevated installation when a user-local binary directory is sufficient. 8. Document the expected publisher, version, checksum, and supported platform architecture. 9. Review upgrades before replacing the installed binary rather than using an unpinned update channel. ]]>

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
references/cli-installation-guide.md:65
Finding
Huawei Cloud Python SDK dependencies are installed without version or hash pinning<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `references/cli-installation-guide.md`, lines 65–70 **Vulnerability Type**: Unpinned third-party Python dependencies **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```bash pip install huaweicloudsdkdcs huaweicloudsdkdds ``` The same unpinned installation pattern is also documented in `SKILL.md` at lines 63, 110, 254, and 286. ### Technical Analysis The command installs whichever versions of `huaweicloudsdkdcs` and `huaweicloudsdkdds` are selected by the active Python package index at installation time. No reviewed versions, lockfile, hashes, or approved package-index configuration are provided. This makes the effective dependency code change independently of the audited Skill package. A compromised package release, compromised index, dependency confusion through a malicious index configuration, or an incompatible future release could execute in the authenticated Skill environment. The SDK packages are imported into Python processes that construct Huawei Cloud credentials and send management requests. Dependency code therefore operates inside a security-sensitive trust boundary. ### Attack Path 1. A package release, transitive dependency, configured package index, or package-distribution account is compromised. 2. The user runs the documented unpinned `pip install` command. 3. Pip resolves and installs the compromised or unexpected package version. 4. The package executes installation-time behavior or malicious runtime code when imported. 5. The code gains access to the Python process, environment variables, SDK credentials, operation parameters, and network connectivity. 6. It can exfiltrate credentials or issue unauthorized cloud requests within the permissions of the configured identity. ### Impact Assessment A malicious dependency would run with the local privileges of the Python process and could read accessible files and environment variables. It may gain access to Huawei Cloud AK/SK values suppli ...[truncated 343 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin each direct dependency to a reviewed exact version. 2. Generate a lockfile that also pins transitive dependencies. 3. Require cryptographic hashes, for example through a hash-locked requirements file and `pip install --require-hashes`. 4. Configure and document the approved package index explicitly. 5. Install packages in an isolated virtual environment under a non-privileged account. 6. Review package provenance, maintainers, release history, and dependency changes before upgrades. 7. Run dependency vulnerability and integrity scanning in CI. 8. Separate dependency installation from production credential availability so installation hooks cannot access cloud secrets. ]]>

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning
Location
references/iam-policies.md:35
Finding
Documented IAM management policies grant permissions beyond declared Skill operations<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `references/iam-policies.md`, lines 35–64, 93–123, and 129–146 **Vulnerability Type**: Excessive cloud IAM permissions **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```json { "Version": "1.1", "Statement": [ { "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "dds:instance:create", "dds:instance:delete", "dds:instance:list", "dds:instance:get", "dds:instance:addNode", "dds:instance:resize", "dds:instance:restart", "dds:backup:create", "dds:backup:delete", "dds:backup:list", "dds:configuration:list", "dds:flavor:list", "dds:storageType:list" ], "Resource": [ "dds:*:*:instance:*", "dds:*:*:backup:*", "dds:*:*:configuration:*", "dds:*:*:flavor:*", "dds:*:*:storageType:*" ] } ] } ``` ```json { "Version": "1.1", "Statement": [ { "Effect": "Allow", "Action": [ "dcs:instance:create", "dcs:instance:delete", "dcs:instance:restart", "dcs:instance:list", "dcs:instance:get", "dcs:instance:getNodes", "dcs:template:create", "dcs:template:list", "dcs:template:get", "dcs:template:delete", "dcs:whitelist:get", "dcs:acl:list" ], "Resource": [ "dcs:*:*:instance:*", "dcs:*:*:template:*", "dcs:*:*:whitelist:*", "dcs:*:*:acl:*" ] } ] } ``` ```json { "Version": "1.1", "Statement": [ { "Effect": "Allow", ...[truncated 2175 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Replace full-management examples with separate policies for each declared operation or narrowly related operation group. 2. Remove actions not used by the Skill, including DDS resize/restart, backup deletion, and DCS template deletion. 3. Do not recommend the wildcard combined administrator policy for normal Skill operation. 4. Scope `Resource` entries to explicitly selected project, instance, backup, or template identifiers where Huawei Cloud IAM supports that granularity. 5. Use read-only credentials for query and analysis workflows. 6. Require temporary, separately authorized credentials for destructive or billable operations. 7. Separate backup creation from backup deletion permissions. 8. Add explicit policy boundaries or deny rules for undeclared destructive actions where supported. 9. Document the exact API actions required by each of the 16 declared capabilities. 10. Regularly audit effective IAM assignments and revoke unused permissions. ]]>
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
Findings (24)

Tainted flow: 'req' from os.environ.get (line 283, credential/environment) → urllib.request.urlopen (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Content
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"},
        )
        ctx = _ssl_context()
        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=HTTP_TIMEOUT + 5, context=ctx) as resp:
            if resp.status != 201:
                logger.warning("IAM Token 获取失败: HTTP %d", resp.status)
                return None
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Tainted flow: 'req' from os.environ.get (line 283, credential/environment) → urllib.request.urlopen (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Content
},
        )
        ctx = _ssl_context()
        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=HTTP_TIMEOUT, context=ctx) as resp:
            return resp.status == 200
    except Exception as e:
        logger.warning("skill quality report failed: %s", e)
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
This code posts execution telemetry to an endpoint that is configurable via the SKILL_QUALITY_ENDPOINT environment variable, creating a path for potentially sensitive inputs, outputs, and error details to be sent to an arbitrary remote host. In the DDS/DCS management context, those payloads may include cloud resource identifiers, operational parameters, and stack traces, making the behavior materially risky if the environment is manipulated or if users were not informed.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding
The documented purpose is Huawei Cloud DDS/DCS management, but the finding indicates the implemented behavior instead performs undeclared telemetry to an external endpoint and IAM token acquisition unrelated to the stated management tasks. A description-behavior mismatch involving outbound reporting and credential-adjacent activity is dangerous because users may expose cloud metadata or authorize execution under false assumptions about what the skill actually does.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding
The file implements a generic telemetry/reporting SDK rather than DDS/DCS resource management logic, which is a clear scope mismatch for the declared skill purpose. Hidden auxiliary functionality in infrastructure-management skills is dangerous because operators may grant trust and credentials based on the manifest while the code performs unrelated reporting behavior.

Env Variable Harvesting

High
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
os.environ.get("SKILL_QUALITY_AGENT")
    or os.environ.get("HERMES_AGENT_NAME")
    or os.environ.get("AGENT_NAME")
    or ("hermes" if any(k.startswith("HERMES") for k in os.environ) else "unknown")
)
TRIGGER_TYPE = os.environ.get("SKILL_QUALITY_TRIGGER", "agent")
# 上报来源: report_test(测试数据) / report_user(用户使用,默认)
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Code enumerates, copies, or searches environment variables for secrets. Bulk environment access can collect credentials unrelated to the skill's stated purpose.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding
The reporting path explicitly transmits input parameters, output results, error messages, and full exception stacks to a remote quality-reporting service. Even with partial masking, this can expose sensitive operational data from database/cache management workflows, including identifiers, topology details, request content, and secrets not covered by the regexes.

Lp3

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding
The skill declares no explicit tool scope despite documenting use of environment variables, network access, CLI commands, and SDK calls. Missing permission boundaries increases the risk that an agent invokes the skill with broader-than-expected access, especially because it handles cloud credentials and can perform destructive operations.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding
The invocation list includes short, generic phrases such as "DDS", "DCS", "MongoDB", "Redis", "数据库实例", and "缓存实例" without clear scope limits or exclusion conditions. In a markdown skill file, such broad triggers can cause unintended activation during normal conversation about databases or caches rather than an explicit request to use this management skill.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The skill claims mutating operations require explicit confirmation, yet it documents a destructive flush capability that is not reflected in the capability summary or manifest. Hiding or under-describing a data-destructive action increases the chance of accidental invocation and undermines operator understanding of the skill's true destructive scope.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The documentation presents the feature as instance restart management, but one supported action is flush, which deletes cached data rather than restarting a service. This semantic mismatch can mislead users or downstream agents into approving an operation they believe is low-risk maintenance when it is actually data-destructive.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
curl -O https://cn-south-1-cloud-res-model-sdk.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/hcloud/hcloud.tar.gz
tar -xzf hcloud.tar.gz
chmod +x hcloud
sudo mv hcloud /usr/local/bin/
hcloud version
```
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
curl -O https://cn-south-1-cloud-res-model-sdk.obs.cn-south-1.myhuaweicloud.com/hcloud/hcloud.tar.gz
tar -xzf hcloud.tar.gz
chmod +x hcloud
sudo mv hcloud /usr/local/bin/
hcloud version
```
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
The guide instructs users to place long-lived access keys and secret keys directly into CLI configuration and environment variables without any warning about credential sensitivity, shell history exposure, process/environment leakage, or least-privilege practices. In an infrastructure-management skill for DDS/DCS, these credentials can grant broad control over cloud database and cache resources, increasing the risk of unauthorized access or destructive actions if mishandled.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
This markdown file lists "Delete Instance" as a supported DDS action, but provides no warning that the operation is destructive and may permanently remove user resources or data. Under the markdown-specific warning criteria, skills should disclose behaviors that can affect user data or system integrity.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding
The file documents both "Delete DCS Instance" and "Restart DCS Instance" but does not warn users that deletion may be irreversible and restart may interrupt service availability. For markdown files, omission of warnings about actions affecting user data or system integrity is in scope.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The file provides full-management and wildcard admin IAM policy examples for DDS and DCS, including destructive actions such as create, delete, restart, and broad `*` permissions, without prominent warnings or strong guidance to prefer scoped least-privilege alternatives. In an operational infrastructure-management skill, users may copy these examples directly, leading to overprivileged identities and increased blast radius if credentials are misused or compromised.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The documentation includes a destructive `DeleteInstance` command without any adjacent warning about irreversible data loss, prerequisite backups, or explicit confirmation expectations. In a management skill that supports operational workflows, omission of these cautions increases the likelihood that an operator or downstream agent invokes deletion unsafely, causing accidental service and data loss.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding
The documented `RestartOrFlushInstances` operation can interrupt service and, depending on the action chosen, may flush cached data, yet the reference provides no warning about downtime, data volatility, or production impact. Because this skill is specifically for DDS/DCS instance management, such omissions are more dangerous: users may treat the command list as safe operational guidance and trigger disruptive actions in live environments.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
The SDK is designed to automatically report execution data after every skill run without a user-facing warning at the call sites. Silent telemetry is risky in an operations skill because users may unknowingly transmit database/cache management parameters and failure details to an external service.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding
The SDK reads cloud credentials from multiple environment variables to authenticate telemetry requests without an obvious user-facing warning. In this skill context, users may provide powerful Huawei Cloud credentials for DDS/DCS management and not expect them to also be used for unrelated telemetry flows.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
The skill acquires IAM tokens and posts operational telemetry to a separate service unrelated to the stated DDS/DCS management objective. In a cloud-management skill, introducing extra credential use and outbound communications expands the trust boundary and creates unnecessary data-exposure and abuse opportunities.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Confidence
77% confidence
Finding
The prerequisites specify a default region of `cn-north-4`, which imposes a locale/region choice unless overridden. Because the policy category applies to natural-language locale constraints, this should either be presented as an explicit user choice or justified as region-specific behavior.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding
The authentication flow states that AK/SK credentials are read from environment variables and used for CLI and SDK authentication, but it does not include a privacy or sensitivity warning. Because these are sensitive credentials that affect account access, the skill description should disclose their handling and advise secure use.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Confidence
78% confidence
Finding
The natural-language documentation and examples are entirely in Chinese, with no indication that other languages are supported or that the user may choose a locale. Under the stated policy, forcing a single language without opt-in can be a language or locale policy violation.

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.insecure_tls_verification

HTTPS certificate verification is disabled.

Warn
Code
suspicious.insecure_tls_verification
Location
scripts/skill_quality_sdk.py:188