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Security audit

X Tweet Speedread

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill mostly matches its paid tweet-summary purpose, but it ships an exposed billing key and can make unbounded network requests from the runtime.

Review before installing. This skill charges before summarizing and sends post or user identifiers to external services. It should not be used until the billing key is removed and rotated, billing is restricted to the intended HTTPS provider, X URL validation is enforced, arbitrary direct fetching is removed, and third-party fetch providers are clearly disclosed.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/run.js:15
Finding

Unrestricted User-Controlled URL Fetching Enables Server-Side Request Forgery

Content
View full analysis
{ if (!t || t.length < 40) return true; const badMarkers = [ 'JavaScript is not available', 'stylesheet-group', 'Please enable JavaScript', '.css-175oi2r', ]; return badMarkers.some((m) => t.includes(m)); }; const tryFetch = async (label, target) => { const r = await fetch(target).catch(() => null); if (!r || !r.ok) { attempts.push({ label, ok: false }); return null; } const t = await r.text(); if (looksBad(t)) { attempts.push({ label, ok: false, reason: 'bad_content' }); return null; } attempts.push({ label, ok: true }); return t; }; let text = await tryFetch('jina', toJina(url)); const sid = extractStatusId(url); if (!text && sid) { text = await tryFetch('fxtwitter-i', `https://api.fxtwitter.com/i/status/${sid}`); if (!text) text = await tryFetch('fxtwitter', `https://api.fxtwitter.com/status/${sid}`); } if (!text) text = await tryFetch('direct', url); return { text: text || '', attempts }; } ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill claims to process X status URLs, but `--url` is accepted without validating its scheme, hostname, port, or path. If the Jina and FxTwitter attempts do not produce acceptable content, the direct fallback passes the attacker-controlled value to `fetch()`. Consequently, the process can issue HTTP requests from the host or container running the Skill to destinations that an external attacker may not be able to reach directly. Potential targets include: - Loopback services such as `127.0.0.1` and `localhost` - Private network ranges - Link-local services - Cloud instance metadata endpoints - Internal ...[truncated 1956 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
`. 5. Remove the direct arbitrary-URL fallback. Retrieve content only through explicitly approved endpoints. 6. Resolve destination hostnames before connecting and reject loopback, private, link-local, multicast, reserved, and cloud metadata address ranges for both IPv4 and IPv6. 7. Disable redirects or validate the scheme, hostname, and resolved address of every redirect destination. 8. Apply request timeouts, response-size limits, and content-type restrictions. 9. Consider deployment-level egress filtering so the Skill can access only the approved X-content and billing services. 10. Document that post URLs or status identifiers may be sent to Jina AI and FxTwitter, or remove these processors if such disclosure is not intended. ]]>

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/run.js:23
Finding

Hard-Coded Billing API Key Can Be Exposed or Redirected to an Untrusted Endpoint

Content
View full analysis
null); if (!res) return null; try { const data = await res.json(); return data?.payment_url || null; } catch { return null; } } async function charge() { if (!SKILL_BILLING_API_KEY || !SKILL_ID) { return { ok: false, reason: 'missing_billing_config' }; } const endpoint = `${BILLING_URL}/charge`; const res = await fetch(endpoint, { method: 'POST', headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json', 'x-api-key': SKILL_BILLING_API_KEY, }, body: JSON.stringify({ user_id: userId, skill_id: SKILL_ID, amount: SKILLPAY_PRICE_TOKEN, meta: { source: 'x-tweet-speedread-skill' }, }), }).catch(() => null); if (!res) return { ok: false, reason: 'network_error' }; let data = null; try { data = await res.json(); } catch {} if (!res.ok || !data) return { ok: false, reason: 'charge_failed', data }; if (data.success) return { ok: true, data }; const paymentUrl = await getPaymentLink(userId, 7); if (paymentUrl) data.payment_url = paymentUrl ...[truncated 2941 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (9)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The declared purpose understates materially sensitive behavior: the skill performs third-party outbound requests and billing-related actions beyond a simple tweet summarization flow, with pricing and payment handling that may not fully align with the description. This is dangerous because users and platforms may authorize the skill under false assumptions, enabling unexpected data disclosure to external services and unanticipated financial actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 26)May include surrounding context.

md
node scripts/run.js --url "https://x.com/.../status/..." --user "<user-id>"

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises executable behavior with environment and network capabilities but does not declare any tool scope or permissions boundary in the manifest. This creates a transparency and governance gap: a host or reviewer cannot reliably enforce least privilege, and users are not clearly informed that the skill may access secrets and make outbound requests.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The manifest description and usage text explicitly state that the skill provides an "instant English brief" and "instant English speedread" for any X post. This imposes a language choice in the skill’s natural-language behavior without indicating any user choice, opt-in, or justified locale constraint.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The file header explicitly states the skill will "Output English speedread summary," and the implementation only provides an English summarizer. This is a natural-language locale choice imposed by the skill with no indication of user choice or opt-in.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill performs charge-first billing before delivering a tweet summary, which introduces financial side effects unrelated to the core data-processing task unless the platform explicitly expects paid skills. More importantly, the file embeds a default live-looking billing API key and initiates remote charge/payment-link requests, creating real risk of unauthorized charges, credential misuse, and abuse if deployed or copied as-is.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The skill transmits user-supplied tweet identifiers to an external third-party service (api.fxtwitter.com) as a fallback fetch path. This creates data-sharing and supply-chain risk because the service can log requests, return manipulated content for summarization, or expose user activity outside the expected X source.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/run.js (reported line 120)May include surrounding context.

js
const sid = extractStatusId(url);
  if (!text && sid) {
    text = await tryFetch('fxtwitter-i', `https://api.fxtwitter.com/i/status/${sid}`);
    if (!text) text = await tryFetch('fxtwitter', `https://api.fxtwitter.com/status/${sid}`);
  }

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

This is a second distinct external transmission path to the same third-party provider and carries the same privacy and integrity concerns. Because the skill summarizes whatever content is fetched, a malicious or compromised intermediary could influence output or collect metadata about requested posts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/run.js (reported line 121)May include surrounding context.

js
const sid = extractStatusId(url);
  if (!text && sid) {
    text = await tryFetch('fxtwitter-i', `https://api.fxtwitter.com/i/status/${sid}`);
    if (!text) text = await tryFetch('fxtwitter', `https://api.fxtwitter.com/status/${sid}`);
  }

  if (!text) text = await tryFetch('direct', url);

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Reading billing credentials from environment variables is normal by itself, but this code also includes a hardcoded fallback secret for SKILL_BILLING_API_KEY. That means anyone with the source can extract and abuse the billing credential, potentially issuing unauthorized charges or creating payment links against the associated account.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.env_credential_access

Environment variable access combined with network send.

Critical
Code
suspicious.env_credential_access
Location
scripts/run.js:23