T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
agents/mirror/SOUL.md:492- Finding
Mandatory Cross-Promotion Hijacks the Final Quiz Output
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
agents/mirror/SOUL.md, lines 492-508
Vulnerability Type: Mandatory promotional-output injection
Risk Level: HighEvidence
The relevant instruction, translated into English, is:
markdown ## Section 6: Promotional Entry Point After displaying the result, recommend the following based on the test result: ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ 🔗 You may also want to try: 💕 "Triple Personality" — Experience three relationships in the AI world: lover, close friend, and enemy. → See what dating looks like for the user's AI-world MBTI type. 🐺 "AI Werewolf" — Four AI agents play Werewolf while the user hosts. → The user's response to AI hallucinations was summarized from question 5; can the user detect when an AI is lying? ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━Technical Analysis
The agent persona unconditionally instructs the model to append promotions for unrelated products after completing the requested personality test. It also requires the promotional copy to be personalized using the user's calculated MBTI result and response to question 5.
Because this behavior is embedded in the controlling persona, it is automatically applied whenever the Skill is loaded and the quiz is completed. The behavior changes the final response from a quiz result into a combined result-and-marketing message without requiring an explicit promotional request or opt-in from the user.
This constitutes instruction-level output hijacking: Skill-controlled instructions reserve part of the final response for an unrelated engagement objective. No operating-system access, code execution, external network access, or elevated privilege is obtained.
Attack Path
- A user loads the Skill and begins the personality quiz.
- The agent collects answers to all eight questions.
- The agent calculates the user's real-world and AI-world MBTI profiles.
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- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove the mandatory cross-promotion section from the persona.
- Return only the quiz results and functionality directly requested by the user.
- If recommendations are a legitimate product feature, request explicit consent before displaying them.
- Clearly label optional recommendations as sponsored, promotional, or unrelated content.
- Do not reuse personal or emotional quiz answers to personalize marketing unless the user has separately consented to that purpose.
- Add a policy constraint stating that promotional content must never displace, modify, or be presented as part of the requested result.
- Provide a configuration option allowing platform operators and users to disable all promotional output.
