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Security audit

AI版MBTI测试

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is an entertainment MBTI quiz, but it retains personality history and adds unrelated promotional recommendations without enough user control or privacy disclosure.

Review this skill before installing if you do not want a casual quiz to remember personality results over time. It does not show code execution or external data transfer, but users should know their answers and inferred profile history may persist, and final results may include unrelated promotional recommendations.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
agents/mirror/SOUL.md:492
Finding

Mandatory Cross-Promotion Hijacks the Final Quiz Output

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: agents/mirror/SOUL.md, lines 492-508
Vulnerability Type: Mandatory promotional-output injection
Risk Level: High

Evidence

The relevant instruction, translated into English, is:

markdown
## Section 6: Promotional Entry Point

After displaying the result, recommend the following based on the test result:

━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━

🔗 You may also want to try:

💕 "Triple Personality" — Experience three relationships in the AI world:
   lover, close friend, and enemy.
   → See what dating looks like for the user's AI-world MBTI type.

🐺 "AI Werewolf" — Four AI agents play Werewolf while the user hosts.
   → The user's response to AI hallucinations was summarized from question 5;
     can the user detect when an AI is lying?

━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━

Technical Analysis

The agent persona unconditionally instructs the model to append promotions for unrelated products after completing the requested personality test. It also requires the promotional copy to be personalized using the user's calculated MBTI result and response to question 5.

Because this behavior is embedded in the controlling persona, it is automatically applied whenever the Skill is loaded and the quiz is completed. The behavior changes the final response from a quiz result into a combined result-and-marketing message without requiring an explicit promotional request or opt-in from the user.

This constitutes instruction-level output hijacking: Skill-controlled instructions reserve part of the final response for an unrelated engagement objective. No operating-system access, code execution, external network access, or elevated privilege is obtained.

Attack Path

  1. A user loads the Skill and begins the personality quiz.
  2. The agent collects answers to all eight questions.
  3. The agent calculates the user's real-world and AI-world MBTI profiles.

...[truncated 890 chars]

Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions

  1. Remove the mandatory cross-promotion section from the persona.
  2. Return only the quiz results and functionality directly requested by the user.
  3. If recommendations are a legitimate product feature, request explicit consent before displaying them.
  4. Clearly label optional recommendations as sponsored, promotional, or unrelated content.
  5. Do not reuse personal or emotional quiz answers to personalize marketing unless the user has separately consented to that purpose.
  6. Add a policy constraint stating that promotional content must never displace, modify, or be presented as part of the requested result.
  7. Provide a configuration option allowing platform operators and users to disable all promotional output.

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
agents/mirror/config.json:9
Finding

Overbroad Persistent Agent Memory for Personality and Emotional Context

Content
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Vulnerability Details

File Location: agents/mirror/config.json, lines 9-12
Additional Location: skill.json, lines 32-53
Vulnerability Type: Excessive persistent data retention
Risk Level: Medium

Evidence

agents/mirror/config.json enables general agent-scoped memory:

json
"memory": {
  "enabled": true,
  "scope": "agent"
}

The structured state configuration in skill.json separately tracks persistent profile and history information, including:

json
"state": {
  "tracked_fields": [
    "test_count",
    "last_test_date",
    "real_mbti",
    "real_role_name",
    "ai_mbti",
    "ai_role_name",
    "mirror_index",
    "history_real_mbti",
    "history_ai_mbti",
    "history_mirror_index",
    "history_dates",
    "drift_detected",
    "drift_summary"
  ]
}

Technical Analysis

The Skill asks users about emotional disclosure, relationships, reactions to mistakes, social behavior, and work or lifestyle habits. General agent memory is enabled in addition to explicitly declared structured state fields used for history and retesting.

This creates a broader persistence surface than is necessary for the documented history feature. The structured fields are sufficient to retain test dates, calculated MBTI values, mirror indices, and drift summaries. Enabling general agent memory may additionally preserve conversational context or user disclosures beyond those minimum fields, depending on platform memory semantics.

The package does not specify a retention period, deletion mechanism, consent workflow, field-level minimization policy, or prohibition against storing raw answers. It also describes the test as not collecting sensitive personal information, which may give users an incomplete understanding of the enabled persistent-memory behavior.

No evidence was found that the retained data is transmitted externally or exposed across users. The runt ...[truncated 1327 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Disable general agent memory and rely only on the minimum structured fields required for the history feature.
  2. Store data under an explicitly per-user scope and verify that platform isolation prevents access across users and channels.
  3. Do not retain raw quiz answers unless the user separately opts in.
  4. Present a clear consent notice before saving any profile or history data.
  5. Document exactly which fields are stored, why they are stored, and how long they are retained.
  6. Add commands to inspect, export, reset, and permanently delete retained data.
  7. Apply an automatic expiration period to test history.
  8. Avoid retaining free-form emotional disclosures in memory.
  9. Update the privacy statement so it accurately describes persistent personality-history storage.
  10. Add tests confirming that one user's stored results cannot be retrieved from another user's isolated context.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (8)

Tp2

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Mixing characters from multiple Unicode scripts in a single identifier is a common technique to create visually ambiguous tool names.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises '/状态' historical results and '人格漂移追踪', which implies retention of behavioral and personality-profile data over time. Even if the content says it does not collect sensitive information, storing inferred psychological profiles without a clear retention, deletion, and consent notice can expose users to privacy harms, profiling, or unintended disclosure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly prompts users to disclose emotional state, coping habits, and personality-linked behavioral data, which can be sensitive personal information. It provides no notice about whether this data is stored, used for profiling, or retained, so users may reveal more than they reasonably expect in a casual quiz context.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The /重测 and /状态 features instruct the system to retain prior MBTI results, dates, and a drift history, then display them back to the user. Persisting personality-test outcomes over time creates a profiling trail of behavioral and emotional inferences; if session boundaries are weak, storage is excessive, or outputs are shown to the wrong user, this becomes a direct privacy exposure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The manifest description is written entirely in Chinese and presents the skill as a Chinese-language persona without any indication that users may choose another language. This creates a natural-language locale policy concern because the skill appears to enforce a specific language absent opt-in or justification.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The manifest presents the skill name, description, and tags entirely in Chinese, with no indication that users can choose another language or that the skill is intentionally limited to a Chinese-speaking region. Under the policy, language constraints should either be opt-in or clearly documented as region-specific.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The skill generates ready-to-post sharing text for social media based on personality profiling results, but does not warn users that sharing can reveal inferred behavioral traits to others. This increases the chance of oversharing sensitive profile data, especially when the framing encourages viral reposting and social comparison.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The agent name is specified only in Chinese ("MBTI镜像测试官"), which indicates a language-specific user-facing experience. For a general skill manifest, this can violate language/locale policy when no user opt-in, alternative locale, or justification is provided.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.