T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
scripts/bootstrap_env.sh:38- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Package Installation from an Implicit Package Index
- Content
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/dev/null 2>&1; then "$PIP_BIN" install --upgrade pip soco fi ``` ### Technical Analysis The bootstrap process installs `pip` and `soco` without fixed versions, integrity hashes, a lock file, or an explicitly trusted package index. Consequently, the code installed by an otherwise unchanged Skill can vary over time or according to the user's `pip` configuration. The command also upgrades `pip`, expanding the mutable dependency set executed during installation. Python packages and their build dependencies may execute code during package building or installation. The installed `soco` package is subsequently imported by the bootstrap process, which executes its module initialization code. Exploitation requires control or compromise of a relevant package release, transitive dependency, configured package index, package mirror, or dependency-resolution path. The reviewed code does not itself establish such control, but it lacks controls that would prevent a supply-chain compromise from reaching the local environment. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises a package release, transitive dependency, package mirror, or package index used by `pip`. 2. The user runs `scripts/install.sh`, which invokes `scripts/bootstrap_env.sh`. 3. If `soco` cannot already be imported from the virtual environment, the bootstrap executes: ```sh "$PIP_BIN" install --upgrade pip soco ``` 4. `pip` resolves and installs the attacker-controlled or compromised package without checking an audited version or expected hash. 5. Malicious code may execute during package build or installation. 6. The bootstrap then imports `soco` when printing its version, and later playback components may import i ...[truncated 769 chars]- Remediation
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