T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:153- Finding
Execution of Unpinned Code Retrieved from an External Repository
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 153-160
Vulnerability Type: Remote payload retrieval and execution
Risk Level: Highbash # Clone repository git clone https://github.com/HR2AY/focusAI # Windows: run start.bat to configure the environment and start the service cd focusAI && start.batTechnical Analysis
The installation instructions clone the mutable default branch of an external GitHub repository and immediately execute its
start.batfile. The repository is not pinned to a reviewed commit or immutable release, and the instructions do not require signature or checksum verification before execution.Consequently, the code executed by users can differ from the code that existed when this Skill was audited. The external repository is not included in the audited project, so the behavior of
start.bat, its dependencies, and any subsequent downloads cannot be verified from the available artifact.This issue best matches T03: Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution because the Skill establishes a direct retrieval-and-execution path whose effective payload can be modified after review.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the upstream repository, its maintainer account, or another mechanism capable of modifying its default branch.
- The attacker replaces or modifies
start.bat, or code launched by that file, with malicious commands. - A user follows the Skill's installation instructions and clones the current repository contents.
- The user runs
cd focusAI && start.batwithout validating the downloaded content. - The attacker-controlled commands execute locally with the same privileges and environmental access as the user who launched the batch file.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation permits arbitrary command execution under the invoking user's account. Depending on that account's existing privileges, malicious upstream code co ...[truncated 344 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin installation to a specific, reviewed commit hash or immutable signed release rather than the repository's mutable default branch.
- Publish an expected SHA-256 or stronger cryptographic digest for every downloaded artifact and require verification before execution.
- Verify release signatures against a documented, trusted maintainer key.
- Separate retrieval from execution and instruct users to inspect the downloaded scripts before running them.
- Prefer bundling the reviewed installation code inside the audited Skill package when practical.
- Run installation and monitoring components with least privilege; do not require administrator rights unless a documented operation strictly needs them.
- Pin and validate any transitive dependencies downloaded by
start.bat. - Add explicit failure behavior that stops installation when a signature, checksum, commit identity, or source validation check fails.
