T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:9- Finding
Unpinned Package Execution Through npx
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md:9
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party package execution
Risk Level: MediumComplete Code Snippet:
yaml openclaw: requires: tools: [filesystem] install: "npx clawhub install job-shadow-risk-assessor"Technical Analysis
The installation command invokes
npxwithout pinning theclawhubpackage to a reviewed version or providing an integrity constraint. Consequently, the code executed during installation depends on whichever package release the npm registry resolves at installation time.The effective installer implementation is not included in the audited project, so its behavior cannot be verified from
SKILL.md. If the package, its dependencies, its publisher account, or the package-resolution process is compromised, arbitrary package CLI or lifecycle code could execute with the permissions of the user running the installation.This is a supply-chain weakness rather than evidence that the current
clawhubpackage is malicious.Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the package publisher, a transitive dependency, or the relevant package-distribution channel.
- The attacker publishes a modified version containing malicious CLI or lifecycle behavior.
- A user follows the skill installation metadata and executes the unpinned
npxcommand. npxretrieves the attacker-controlled release because no reviewed version or integrity value is specified.- The malicious package code executes under the installing user's account.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation could provide code execution with the privileges of the user invoking
npx. Depending on that user's permissions, exposed resources could include local files, environment variables, authentication tokens, source repositories, and writable user-level configuration.The issue does not itself establish administrative access or persistence; those ...[truncated 87 chars]
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Pin
clawhubto a specifically reviewed version rather than allowing dynamic resolution of the latest release. - Use a lockfile and verified package-integrity hashes where supported.
- Document the expected package registry and official publisher identity.
- Review the package, its lifecycle scripts, and its transitive dependency tree before allowing execution.
- Prefer an installation process that separates package retrieval from execution and verifies the downloaded artifact first.
- Run installation with the minimum required operating-system privileges in an isolated environment.
A hardened command should reference an explicitly reviewed version, for example:
yaml install: "npx clawhub@<reviewed-version> install job-shadow-risk-assessor"Version pinning should be combined with integrity verification because pinning alone does not protect against registry artifact replacement or publisher compromise.
- Pin
