T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
scripts/generate.sh:21- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Dependency Installed During Normal Execution
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
scripts/generate.sh:21
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned runtime dependency installation and supply-chain exposure
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
bash uv pip install gradio_client --quiet 2>/dev/null || pip3 install gradio_client --quiet 2>/dev/nullTechnical Analysis
The script automatically installs
gradio_clientduring normal execution without specifying a reviewed version, lockfile, or package hash. Package resolution can therefore retrieve a different package release or different transitive dependencies each time the Skill runs.The fallback from
uv piptopip3also makes the installation environment unpredictable. Depending on the user's configuration and permissions,pip3may modify a shared user or system Python environment rather than an isolated environment. Suppressing standard error further obscures installation failures and relevant security warnings.The panorama generator legitimately requires a Gradio client, but modifying the Python environment on every invocation exceeds the minimum behavior needed to generate a panorama. Dependency installation should be a separate, explicit setup operation using reviewed and reproducible versions.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises a future
gradio_clientrelease, one of its transitive dependencies, or the applicable package-distribution channel. - A user invokes
scripts/generate.sh. - The script resolves and installs the unpinned package or compromised dependency.
- Malicious package code executes during installation or when
generator.pyimportsgradio_client. - The code runs with the permissions of the user who launched the Skill.
This is a supply-chain exposure rather than evidence that the current
gradio_clientpackage is malicious.Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation could permit arbitrary code execution with the invoking user's privileges. Th ...[truncated 315 chars]
- An attacker compromises a future
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Move dependency installation out of the normal generation workflow and require an explicit setup step.
- Pin
gradio_clientand all transitive dependencies to reviewed versions in a lockfile. - Require package hashes where supported.
- Install dependencies into a dedicated virtual environment rather than falling back to an unspecified
pip3environment. - Remove error suppression so users can inspect package-resolution and integrity failures.
- Configure the package installer to use an explicitly trusted index.
- Periodically review and deliberately update pinned dependencies after security testing.
