T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
SKILL.md:22- Finding
Overly Broad Access to Sensitive Workspace State and Configuration
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 22-33 and 68-69
Vulnerability Type: Excessive access to memory, credential-related configuration, and agent configuration
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
markdown ## Daily Checks - [ ] Memory files from past 3 days — anything to consolidate into MEMORY.md? - [ ] Artifact dirs — anything older than 7 days that can archive? - [ ] Research files — leads older than 30 days flagged as stale? - [ ] HEARTBEAT.md — still reflects current priorities? - [ ] TOOLS.md — API keys and configs still accurate? ## Weekly Deep Clean - [ ] Archive memory files older than 7 days to `memory/archive/` - [ ] Update MEMORY.md with distilled learnings from daily notes - [ ] Refresh stale research (flag for Scout re-search) - [ ] Check for orphaned files (generated/ artifacts/ tmp/) - [ ] Verify all agent skill configs match current realitymarkdown 2. Scan workspace against checklists 3. Execute cleanup actionsTechnical Analysis
The skill instructs the agent to inspect long-term memory,
TOOLS.md, and all agent skill configurations.TOOLS.mdis explicitly described as containing API-key and configuration information. These resources are substantially more sensitive than ordinary cleanup targets.The instructions do not define a path allowlist, credential-redaction requirements, read-versus-write boundaries, or approval controls for agent-configuration changes. Consequently, a maintenance invocation may place credential values and private memory into the agent context. Because the workflow also updates
MEMORY.mdand creates maintenance reports, sensitive information observed during scanning could potentially be copied into persistent files.This breaks least-privilege principles: validating whether configuration is current generally requires metadata or status checks, not unrestricted access to secret values or authority to modif ...[truncated 1350 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Define an explicit allowlist of directories and files the skill may inspect.
- Prohibit reading or reporting API-key values, tokens, passwords, private keys, and other secret fields.
- Validate credential configuration through presence, expiry metadata, or dedicated secret-management APIs rather than opening plaintext values.
- Add mandatory redaction before writing
MEMORY.mdor maintenance reports. - Separate read-only auditing from mutation operations and require explicit user approval before changing agent configurations.
- Restrict report permissions and ensure reports contain file names and status information rather than file contents.
- State explicitly that
TOOLS.md, credential stores, and unrelated agent configurations are out of scope unless the user authorizes each target.
