T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
skill/scripts/search.sh:25- Finding
Undisclosed API and Functionality Substitution
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is not clearly malicious, but its documentation says Zhipu web search while the shipped script sends prompts and a bearer token to a different Doubao/Volcengine image-generation service.
Review before installing. Only use this skill if you are comfortable with prompts and the configured API token being sent to Volcengine/Doubao for image generation, not just to Zhipu for web search. The publisher should align the name, description, endpoint, credential instructions, script name, and user-consent language before this is treated as a normal install.
skill/scripts/search.sh:25Undisclosed API and Functionality Substitution
The declared purpose says this skill performs internet/web search via Zhipu for current information. The actual code does not search the web at all. Instead, it sends a prompt to an image generation model (doubao-image-v1) hosted at a Volcengine/Doubao endpoint and returns an image URL. This is a materially different primary purpose and uses different resources and credentials than described, so it is a clear mismatch.
The script is an executable shell program that performs networked actions, but the metadata reportedly does not declare shell capability/permissions. This mismatch is dangerous because it hides the true execution surface from reviewers and users, increasing the chance that powerful behavior is approved without appropriate scrutiny or sandboxing.
The skill metadata says this is a Zhipu web search skill, but the implementation calls Doubao's image-generation API instead. This capability mismatch is dangerous because it defeats informed consent and policy review: a user or platform may authorize a search tool while actually exposing prompts to a different third-party service for a different purpose.
The skill is named 'doubao-image' while the manifest and instructions describe a Zhipu web search capability. This identity mismatch can mislead reviewers, routing logic, or users into invoking the skill under false assumptions, which increases the chance of inappropriate tool use and weakens trust in the skill's declared behavior.
The skill transmits user-supplied query content and an authorization bearer token to an external third-party API over the network. Even when this is the intended function, it is security-relevant because sensitive prompts or identifiers may be disclosed outside the local environment, and the token handling model increases exposure if logs, process inspection, or misuse occur.
export DOUBAO_API_KEY="your_key"
curl -s -X POST "https://open.bigmodel.cn/api/paas/v4/chat/completions" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $DOUBAO_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
The example request hardcodes the user message content as "搜索: YOUR_QUERY", which imposes a specific language/locale behavior in the skill instructions. The document does not indicate that users may choose their preferred language or that Chinese is required for a justified region-specific reason.
The trigger guidance is broad enough to match many ordinary requests for general information, latest news, or fact-finding. Over-broad activation can cause the agent to send user queries externally when a local answer would suffice, creating unnecessary data exposure and unexpected use of third-party services.
The package metadata is internally inconsistent: the skill is named 'doubao-image' while the description states it performs Zhipu web search. This can mislead reviewers, users, or automated policy systems about the skill's real capability, increasing the chance that networked search behavior is installed or approved under an image-related label. In an agent-skill ecosystem, such mislabeling weakens trust boundaries and can conceal higher-risk behaviors behind a less suspicious package identity.
The skill description uses broad triggers like web image, latest news, and current information, which can cause the skill to be invoked for loosely related requests. Over-broad routing increases the chance that user prompts or sensitive context are sent to an external API unnecessarily, creating avoidable data exposure and unintended tool use.
The skill sends user-supplied query content to https://open.bigmodel.cn/api/paas/v4/chat/completions, which is an external third-party service. External transmission is expected for this skill, but it is still a real security/privacy concern because ambiguous routing and lack of explicit guardrails can result in unnecessary disclosure of user data or sensitive context.
export DOUBAO_API_KEY="your_key"
curl -s -X POST "https://open.bigmodel.cn/api/paas/v4/chat/completions" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $DOUBAO_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
The 'When to Use' section lists generic phrases such as 'look up' and 'latest news about,' which are common across many benign queries and can trigger unnecessary external calls. In agent settings, ambiguous activation criteria raise the risk of data being transmitted to a third party without clear need or user awareness.
The inline comment explicitly identifies the script as an image-generation tool, contradicting the manifest's stated web-search purpose. While a comment alone is not exploit code, in this context it reinforces that the skill is misrepresented, which can mislead reviewers and mask undeclared external processing of user input.
The script performs outbound network transmission of user-controlled content to an external API endpoint. External transmission is expected for many integrations, but here it is risk-relevant because the destination and function contradict the declared skill purpose, making the data flow less transparent and more likely to violate user expectations or platform policy.
prompt: $prompt
}')
RESULT=$(curl -s --proto =https --tlsv1.2 -m 60 -X POST "https://ark.cn-beijing.volces.com/api/v3/images/generations" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "$PAYLOAD")
The script forwards the user-supplied prompt to an external third-party API without any user-facing disclosure in the skill itself. This creates a privacy and consent risk because users may provide sensitive text believing they are using a search skill, while their content is actually transmitted to an unrelated image-generation endpoint.
L22 states that the API key will be visible in ps aux, which actively misdescribes the demonstrated command usage. In the examples at L40-L42, the shell expands $DOUBAO_API_KEY before invoking curl, so the key does appear in the process arguments; however this depends on execution context and is not a guaranteed property of the script itself as documented here, making the statement overbroad and misleading as written.