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Security audit

snipit.sh

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is for sharing snippets through snipit.sh, but it normalizes uploading .env files and secrets to an external service without enough warning or safeguards.

Review this before installing. Use it only for material you are allowed to send to snipit.sh, redact secrets and personal data first, avoid uploading .env files or private keys, and do not pass real passwords directly on the command line. Prefer an approved internal sharing or secret-management tool for credentials.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (3)

other

Error
Location
SKILL.md:43
Finding

Uncontrolled Transmission of Sensitive Data to an External Service

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:23
Finding

Snippet Passwords Exposed Through Command-Line Arguments

Content
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Remediation
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T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:13
Finding

Unpinned Global Installation of a Third-Party npm Package

Content
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Remediation
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SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (5)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The example snipit create .env -t "Config" -p secret -b -e 1h encourages uploading a .env file, which commonly contains API keys, database passwords, and other credentials, to a third-party service. Password protection and burn-after-read reduce exposure but do not eliminate the risk of credential leakage, weak passwords, mishandling, server-side compromise, or policy violations.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 24)May include surrounding context.

md
cat code.js | snipit -l javascript

# With options
snipit create .env -t "Config" -p secret -b -e 1h

# Get snippet
snipit get abc123 -p secret

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

This example again normalizes uploading a .env file to an external service under the label 'Secure config,' which may mislead users into believing password protection and burn-after-read make credential sharing safe. In practice, .env files frequently contain production secrets, so the skill context makes this more dangerous by specifically targeting sensitive configuration material.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 63)May include surrounding context.

md
tail -100 app.log | snipit -e 1h

# Secure config (password + burn)
snipit create .env -p secret123 -b

# Build output
./build.sh 2>&1 | snipit -t "Build log"

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly markets sharing 'secrets' and shows examples uploading .env files to snipit.sh, but it does not clearly warn that the data is being transmitted to a third-party external service. Even if the service uses encryption and optional password protection, this can normalize exfiltration of credentials or sensitive configuration outside the local environment.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The curl fallback directly documents posting arbitrary content to https://snipit.sh/api/snippets without any caution that the payload leaves the host and is stored by an external service. This is especially risky because the fallback is low-level and easy to adapt for automated upload of sensitive code, logs, or secrets.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

This command performs explicit external transmission of user-supplied content to a third-party HTTPS endpoint. In context, that is the intended function of the skill, but it still represents a real data exfiltration path if used on sensitive code, logs, configs, or secrets.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 45)May include surrounding context.

bash
# Create
curl -X POST https://snipit.sh/api/snippets \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"content":"code","language":"python","burnAfterRead":true}'

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.