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Security audit

oh-my-git-commit

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This git commit helper is mostly coherent, but its broad triggers and lack of explicit confirmation before staging or committing create a real risk of unintended repository changes.

Install only if you want a Bash-powered git commit assistant. Before letting it act, require it to show git status, the exact files to stage, and the final commit message; avoid using broad natural-language prompts when you do not intend to create a commit.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (6)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 86)May include surrounding context.

git add -p

text

**禁止提交机密信息**(.env、credentials.json、私钥等)。

### 3. 生成 Commit Message

Shadow Command Trigger

Medium
Category
Trigger Abuse
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

Using a trigger that conflicts with a built-in command creates ambiguity over which handler will execute, which can lead to unexpected or unintended behavior. In a repository-modifying skill, that ambiguity is dangerous because users may invoke the built-in command semantics but instead trigger custom staging and commit logic.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The condition "用户要求提交更改" is ambiguous and lacks precise boundaries, so the skill may interpret general discussion about submitting or saving changes as authorization to run Git operations. This increases the chance of unintended staging or commits based on conversational context rather than explicit user consent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The trigger phrase "commit" is extremely broad and can match ordinary conversation, causing the skill to activate when the user did not intend to perform a Git commit. In a skill that can stage files and create repository history, accidental invocation can lead to unintended source-control actions or disclosure of sensitive diffs to the agent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The instruction "message 使用中文撰写" forces a specific language for output, and the examples reinforce that requirement. There is no opt-in, user choice, or documented regional justification, which makes this a natural-language locale policy violation under the stated rules.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Overly Broad Trigger

Low
Category
Trigger Abuse
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The trigger "提交" is too short and generic, making accidental activation likely during normal Chinese conversation about submitting, uploading, or turning in work. Because the skill can inspect diffs, stage files, and create commits, this broad trigger expands the attack surface for unintended repository changes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.