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Security audit

Use HL Names API

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The core HL Names skill is purpose-aligned, but the packaged evaluation runner handles API keys and live mint-pass authorization data in ways users should review before running it.

Install only the canonical OpenClaw skill directory if you just need HL Names API guidance. Do not run the eval runner with an untrusted .env, custom --base-url, or live mint-pass tests unless you are comfortable sending live API responses to configured model providers and keeping result artifacts locally.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (4)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
runner/run.sh:403
Finding

HLN API Credential Disclosure Through an Unrestricted Base URL

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
evals/use-hln-api.lvl1.yaml:182
Finding

Live Mint-Pass Authorization Material Is Disclosed to External Model Providers

Content
View full analysis
/dev/null 2>&1; then pretty_live_response="$(jq '.' "$live_file")" mechanical_checks=$(jq '. + {json_parseable: true}' <<<"$mechanical_checks") else pretty_live_response="$(cat "$live_file")" mechanical_checks=$(jq '. + {json_parseable: false}' <<<"$mechanical_checks") fi ... CTX[live_response]="$pretty_live_response" prompt_template="$(yq -r ".evals[$i].prompt_template" "$EVAL_FILE")" pr ...[truncated 3034 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Warning
Location
evals/use-hln-api.lvl1.yaml:154
Finding

User-Controlled HLN Record Data Is Forwarded to Models Without Prompt-Injection Isolation

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
runner/run.sh:16
Finding

Automatic Sourcing of the Project Environment File Enables Arbitrary Shell Execution

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
Findings (55)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 45)May include surrounding context.

Copy the env template and fill in the keys you actually plan to use:

bash
cp .env.example .env

The runner auto-loads ./.env if present. For live evals, HLN_API_KEY is optional because the runner falls back to the built-in public agent key. Set it only if you want to override that default.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The declared purpose is an HL Names API integration/operation skill, but the supplied code does not interact with the Hyperliquid Names API at all. Instead, it processes a local benchmark JSON file and emits a markdown report of evaluation results. This is a materially different primary purpose and accesses different resources than declared. Therefore, the description does not accurately represent the code's behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The declared description presents an operational HL Names API skill for resolving names and related HLN tasks. The supplied code chunk does not implement that user-facing functionality directly; instead, it is infrastructure for evaluating such a skill. Its main purpose is to run benchmark cases, invoke models, judge outputs, perform baseline comparisons, and save reports. While it does access the Hyperliquid Names API, that access is in service of live eval setup/checks, not direct fulfillment of the declared use cases. The additional dependence on external LLM providers and benchmarking/reporting behavior is material and undeclared, so this is a description-behavior mismatch.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The declared description centers on consulting and operating against the Hyperliquid Names API. However, the actual code chunk does not call any API, resolve names, inspect records, or support HyperEVM integration. Its sole purpose is local repository maintenance: verifying the presence of a canonical SKILL.md, comparing root files to a source directory, deleting/recreating a references directory, and copying files. That is a materially different primary purpose from the declared skill behavior, so this is a clear mismatch.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · env-example.txt (reported line 4)May include surrounding context.

text
# Copy to `.env` and fill in the values before running the eval suite.
#
# Example:
#   cp .env.example .env
#   set -a
#   source .env
#   set +a

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · env-example.txt (reported line 6)May include surrounding context.

text
# Copy to `.env` and fill in the values before running the eval suite.
#
# Example:
#   cp .env.example .env
#   set -a
#   source .env
#   set +a

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

Sourcing the entire .env file executes shell syntax, not just key-value parsing, so a malicious or tampered .env can run arbitrary commands in the user's shell context. This is more dangerous than simple secret loading because the file is treated as executable code.

Content

Scanner excerpt · runner/run.sh (reported line 16)May include surrounding context.

sh
RESULTS_DIR="$ROOT/results"
JUDGE_PROMPT="$SCRIPT_DIR/judge.md"

if [[ -f "$ROOT/.env" ]]; then
  set -a
  # shellcheck disable=SC1091
  source "$ROOT/.env"

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · runner/run.sh (reported line 19)May include surrounding context.

sh
if [[ -f "$ROOT/.env" ]]; then
  set -a
  # shellcheck disable=SC1091
  source "$ROOT/.env"
  set +a
fi

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/sync-codex-skill.sh (reported line 18)May include surrounding context.

sh
exit 0
fi

rm -rf "$ROOT/references"
mkdir -p "$ROOT/references"

cp "$SRC/SKILL.md" "$ROOT/SKILL.md"

Skill Enumeration

Medium
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 95)May include surrounding context.

Codex CLI

Codex uses skills from ~/.codex/skills/<skill-name>.

bash
mkdir -p ~/.codex/skills

Skill Enumeration

Medium
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 98)May include surrounding context.

Codex uses skills from ~/.codex/skills/<skill-name>.

bash
mkdir -p ~/.codex/skills
cp -R . ~/.codex/skills/use-hln-api

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 98)May include surrounding context.

Codex uses skills from ~/.codex/skills/<skill-name>.

bash
mkdir -p ~/.codex/skills
cp -R . ~/.codex/skills/use-hln-api

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The same external-transmission concern applies to the testnet endpoint: user identifiers and optional credentials are sent to a remote service outside the agent environment. In context this is less dangerous than arbitrary exfiltration because the destination is documented and aligned to the skill's purpose, but it still represents data egress that should be disclosed and controlled.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 23)May include surrounding context.

md
- Determine whether the user supplied an API key.

Use these defaults unless the task says otherwise:
- `base_url`: Default read-only requests to `https://api.hlnames.xyz/`. Use `https://api.testnet.hlnames.xyz/` when the user asks for testnet. Use a local URL only when the user provides one.
- `api_key`: Send as `X-API-Key` on API requests. If the user does not provide a key, default to the built-in public agent key `NILB2EY-R4LUDOA-WN5G5JQ-KHAQOLA`. If the user provides a key, prefer that override. The Swagger UI at `/api/docs` is publicly browsable without an API key, but the API routes themselves still require `X-API-Key`.
- `identifier`: Use the correct identifier shape for the endpoint.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The same external-transmission concern applies to the testnet endpoint: user identifiers and optional credentials are sent to a remote service outside the agent environment. In context this is less dangerous than arbitrary exfiltration because the destination is documented and aligned to the skill's purpose, but it still represents data egress that should be disclosed and controlled.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 23)May include surrounding context.

md
- Determine whether the user supplied an API key.

Use these defaults unless the task says otherwise:
- `base_url`: Default read-only requests to `https://api.hlnames.xyz/`. Use `https://api.testnet.hlnames.xyz/` when the user asks for testnet. Use a local URL only when the user provides one.
- `api_key`: Send as `X-API-Key` on API requests. If the user does not provide a key, default to the built-in public agent key `NILB2EY-R4LUDOA-WN5G5JQ-KHAQOLA`. If the user provides a key, prefer that override. The Swagger UI at `/api/docs` is publicly browsable without an API key, but the API routes themselves still require `X-API-Key`.
- `identifier`: Use the correct identifier shape for the endpoint.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill hard-codes and instructs use of a built-in public API key, which normalizes credential sharing and could encourage broad, unattributed use of a secret-like value. Even if the key is intended to be public, embedding it in reusable skill content creates abuse, rate-limit exhaustion, and operational accountability risks, and may mislead users about safe credential handling.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The manifest context says the skill is for resolving names, reverse-resolving addresses, fetching profiles, diagnosing failures, and preparing mint-pass requests. However, this file's own description states it contains 'Harder HL Names evals' and the contents are an eval suite with prompts, assertions, and live test definitions, not the operational skill behavior itself.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The runner for an HL Names API skill also loads general-purpose LLM provider credentials from .env, expanding the credential and trust boundary beyond the skill's stated purpose. This becomes risky because the same script later sends prompts, skill bundles, and live API responses to external model providers, so unrelated secrets can be consumed by a tool users may assume is only for HLN evaluation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · env-example.txt (reported line 15)May include surrounding context.

text
EVAL_FILE="$EVALS_DIR/use-hln-api.lvl1.yaml"
EVAL_ID_FILTER=""
RUN_BASELINE=true
HLN_BASE_URL="${HLN_BASE_URL:-https://api.hlnames.xyz/}"
HLN_PUBLIC_AGENT_API_KEY="NILB2EY-R4LUDOA-WN5G5JQ-KHAQOLA"
HLN_API_KEY="${HLN_API_KEY:-$HLN_PUBLIC_AGENT_API_KEY}"
TIMESTAMP="$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S)"

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · env-example.txt (reported line 16)May include surrounding context.

text
EVAL_FILE="$EVALS_DIR/use-hln-api.lvl1.yaml"
EVAL_ID_FILTER=""
RUN_BASELINE=true
HLN_BASE_URL="${HLN_BASE_URL:-https://api.hlnames.xyz/}"
HLN_PUBLIC_AGENT_API_KEY="NILB2EY-R4LUDOA-WN5G5JQ-KHAQOLA"
HLN_API_KEY="${HLN_API_KEY:-$HLN_PUBLIC_AGENT_API_KEY}"
TIMESTAMP="$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S)"

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · evals/use-hln-api.lvl1.yaml (reported line 77)May include surrounding context.

yaml
EVAL_FILE="$EVALS_DIR/use-hln-api.lvl1.yaml"
EVAL_ID_FILTER=""
RUN_BASELINE=true
HLN_BASE_URL="${HLN_BASE_URL:-https://api.hlnames.xyz/}"
HLN_PUBLIC_AGENT_API_KEY="NILB2EY-R4LUDOA-WN5G5JQ-KHAQOLA"
HLN_API_KEY="${HLN_API_KEY:-$HLN_PUBLIC_AGENT_API_KEY}"
TIMESTAMP="$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S)"

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · evals/use-hln-api.lvl1.yaml (reported line 81)May include surrounding context.

yaml
EVAL_FILE="$EVALS_DIR/use-hln-api.lvl1.yaml"
EVAL_ID_FILTER=""
RUN_BASELINE=true
HLN_BASE_URL="${HLN_BASE_URL:-https://api.hlnames.xyz/}"
HLN_PUBLIC_AGENT_API_KEY="NILB2EY-R4LUDOA-WN5G5JQ-KHAQOLA"
HLN_API_KEY="${HLN_API_KEY:-$HLN_PUBLIC_AGENT_API_KEY}"
TIMESTAMP="$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S)"

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · evals/use-hln-api.lvl2.yaml (reported line 43)May include surrounding context.

yaml
EVAL_FILE="$EVALS_DIR/use-hln-api.lvl1.yaml"
EVAL_ID_FILTER=""
RUN_BASELINE=true
HLN_BASE_URL="${HLN_BASE_URL:-https://api.hlnames.xyz/}"
HLN_PUBLIC_AGENT_API_KEY="NILB2EY-R4LUDOA-WN5G5JQ-KHAQOLA"
HLN_API_KEY="${HLN_API_KEY:-$HLN_PUBLIC_AGENT_API_KEY}"
TIMESTAMP="$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S)"

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · evals/use-hln-api.lvl2.yaml (reported line 45)May include surrounding context.

yaml
EVAL_FILE="$EVALS_DIR/use-hln-api.lvl1.yaml"
EVAL_ID_FILTER=""
RUN_BASELINE=true
HLN_BASE_URL="${HLN_BASE_URL:-https://api.hlnames.xyz/}"
HLN_PUBLIC_AGENT_API_KEY="NILB2EY-R4LUDOA-WN5G5JQ-KHAQOLA"
HLN_API_KEY="${HLN_API_KEY:-$HLN_PUBLIC_AGENT_API_KEY}"
TIMESTAMP="$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S)"

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · evals/use-hln-api.lvl2.yaml (reported line 49)May include surrounding context.

yaml
EVAL_FILE="$EVALS_DIR/use-hln-api.lvl1.yaml"
EVAL_ID_FILTER=""
RUN_BASELINE=true
HLN_BASE_URL="${HLN_BASE_URL:-https://api.hlnames.xyz/}"
HLN_PUBLIC_AGENT_API_KEY="NILB2EY-R4LUDOA-WN5G5JQ-KHAQOLA"
HLN_API_KEY="${HLN_API_KEY:-$HLN_PUBLIC_AGENT_API_KEY}"
TIMESTAMP="$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S)"