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Security audit

AI Short Film Finalization — Route C (Flow Free)

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed AI film workflow, but it asks to automate a logged-in Chrome profile and generates executable shell commands from editable project data, creating review-worthy security risk.

Install only in an isolated project and browser profile, not your everyday Chrome profile. Do not run exported execution_cmd values blindly; inspect or convert them to structured arguments first. Pin dependencies before use, avoid the pkill Chrome startup command, and treat storyboard/project-name input as untrusted until the HTML and shell escaping issues are fixed.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Findings (4)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
review-final-v4.py:137
Finding

Stored JavaScript Injection in the Generated Review Console

Content
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` element. In particular, an attacker-controlled string containing `` can terminate the surrounding script element even when the string is inside serialized JSON. The remainder of the value can then introduce an arbitrary HTML element or a new script block. The project name is independently inserted into a JavaScript single-quoted string and into HTML title and heading contexts. Characters such as single quotes, angle brackets, and script-closing sequences are not escaped for those contexts. Some manifest values are also later used to construct elements through `innerHTML`, increasing the number of potential injection sinks. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker supplies or modifies `storyboard-v2.js ...[truncated 1420 chars]
Remediation
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``` Populate that element using a safe HTML serializer, then load it with: ```javascript const MANIFEST = JSON.parse( document.getElementById("manifest-data").textContent ); ``` 3. If JSON must remain inline, escape at least `<`, `>`, `&`, U+2028, and U+2029 after serialization. Escaping `<` prevents `` from terminating the script element. 4. Serialize the project name as a JavaScript value rather than inserting it into a quoted string. 5. Use `textContent`, `createElement`, and `setAttribute` instead of constructing attacker-influenced markup with `innerHTML`. 6. Validate storyboard IDs, titles, paths, and other manifest fields against explicit schemas. 7. Add Content Security Policy restrictions that disallow inline scripts and limit outbound connections. 8. Add regression tests using payloads containing ``, quotes, event handlers, and HTML tags. ]]>

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
review-director-template.html:604
Finding

Shell-Command Injection Through Exported Execution Commands

Content
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Remediation
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T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
SKILL.md:26
Finding

Authenticated Browser Profile Exposed Through Chrome DevTools Protocol

Content
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Remediation
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T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:49
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Dependencies Installed at Runtime

Content
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Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (12)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The declared description presents a broad end-to-end short-film finalization system, including generative media creation, composition, narration, automation, review console, and trailer output. The supplied code chunk is much narrower: it assumes a completed final video already exists and produces review artifacts by extracting segments, audio, and frames, then generating a self-contained HTML review page and manifest. While the 'director review console' aspect is partially consistent, the chunk does not implement most of the major declared capabilities and its primary function is post-production review packaging rather than finalizing an AI-generated short film. Therefore this is a material description/behavior mismatch.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The skill documents shell execution, file reads/writes, and automation behavior but declares no explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. In an agent environment, this creates unnecessary authority and weakens review boundaries, making it easier for the skill to be run with broader capabilities than users expect.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly instructs connecting Playwright over CDP to the user's already logged-in Chrome session and reusing the existing Google authentication state, cookies, and browser context. That exposes highly privileged session data to automation and increases the blast radius of any prompt injection, script mistake, or compromised workflow, because the agent can act as the user inside an authenticated browser.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The documented startup command begins with pkill -9 "Google Chrome", which forcibly terminates all Chrome processes and can destroy unsaved browser state, active work, or downloads. In an agent-driven workflow, this is risky because it performs a destructive host action unrelated to the core film-processing task without an explicit warning or safer fallback.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

This HTML template hard-codes lang="zh-CN", and the visible interface text throughout the page is exclusively in Chinese. Under the policy rule, forcing a specific language or locale without user opt-in is a natural-language policy violation unless the constraint is explicitly justified, which is not present in this file.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
81% confidence
Finding

The manifest describes a review/finalization workflow and mentions a director review console, but this HTML console goes further by synthesizing concrete shell command templates for video, audio, and subtitle regeneration. Producing execution-ready commands is a workflow-orchestration capability rather than merely reviewing or exporting editorial decisions, and it is not clearly justified by the UI's stated review role in this file.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

This code file contains user-facing natural language that assumes a single language/locale, including the module docstring and later console messaging. The policy explicitly calls for flagging language or locale constraints when the skill forces a specific language without user opt-in.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · review-final-v4.py (reported line 24)May include surrounding context.

python
def get_duration(path):
    r = subprocess.run(
        [FFPROBE, "-v", "quiet", "-show_entries", "format=duration",
         "-of", "csv=p=0", str(path)],
        capture_output=True, text=True

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · review-final-v4.py (reported line 79)May include surrounding context.

python
"-c:a", "aac", "-b:a", "128k", "-ar", "44100",
                str(clip_path)
            ]
            subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)

        # 提取独立 audio
        audio_name = f"{pad2(sid)}-{title}.mp3"

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · review-final-v4.py (reported line 91)May include surrounding context.

python
"-c:a", "aac", "-b:a", "128k", "-ar", "44100",
                str(clip_path)
            ]
            subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)

        # 提取独立 audio
        audio_name = f"{pad2(sid)}-{title}.mp3"

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · review-final-v4.py (reported line 104)May include surrounding context.

python
"-c:a", "aac", "-b:a", "128k", "-ar", "44100",
                str(clip_path)
            ]
            subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)

        # 提取独立 audio
        audio_name = f"{pad2(sid)}-{title}.mp3"

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The parameter table specifies --prompt as 英文提示词 (English prompt) as a requirement. This imposes a language constraint in the skill instructions without giving the user a language option or explaining why English is required as a documented limitation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.