T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:31- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Plugin Installation and Allowlisting
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 31-35
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependency
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
bash openclaw plugins install clawhub:clawlink-plugin openclaw config set tools.alsoAllow '["clawlink-plugin"]' --strict-json openclaw gateway restartTechnical Analysis
The installation procedure retrieves
clawlink-pluginfrom a third-party package registry without specifying an immutable version, source revision, cryptographic checksum, or signature. The plugin's implementation is not included in the audited project, so its behavior and integrity cannot be verified from the available files.The following commands then add the plugin to the tool allowlist and restart the gateway, causing the retrieved package to be trusted and loaded. Because the dependency is mutable, the code installed by a user may differ from the code that existed when this skill was reviewed.
This creates a supply-chain risk: compromise of the registry entry, publisher account, package distribution infrastructure, or a later release could introduce attacker-controlled behavior.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the plugin publisher account, registry entry, or package distribution channel, or publishes a malicious later release under the same package identity.
- A user follows the documented command without specifying a trusted immutable version.
- OpenClaw downloads the currently available package, including the attacker's changes.
- The user explicitly adds
clawlink-plugintotools.alsoAllow. - The gateway restart loads and activates the compromised plugin.
- The malicious plugin executes with the permissions available to an OpenClaw plugin and may intercept integration requests or access data exposed through the OAuth-mediated workflow.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation could permit attacker-controlled plugin code to operate within the OpenClaw plugin environment. The pr ...[truncated 496 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin the plugin to an immutable, reviewed version or source commit rather than installing the latest package implicitly.
- Publish and verify a cryptographic checksum or trusted publisher signature before installation.
- Link to the plugin's auditable source code and document the exact source revision corresponding to the pinned release.
- Document the plugin's required permissions, OAuth scopes, network destinations, and data-handling behavior.
- Separate installation from allowlisting so integrity and permission checks occur before the plugin is trusted.
- Apply least privilege to the plugin's filesystem, network, credential, and tool access.
- Establish dependency monitoring and a controlled update process in which each new version is reviewed before deployment.
- Where supported, configure the package manager to reject unsigned packages or artifacts whose integrity metadata does not match.
