T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:13- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Plugin Enables Supply-Chain Risk in Financial Operations
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 13-72
Vulnerability Type:T08: Insecure Dependencies
Risk Level: MediumRelevant Code Snippets:
markdown ## Quick start 1. Install the verified ClawLink plugin: `openclaw plugins install clawhub:clawlink-plugin`markdown ### Installing the plugin If the ClawLink plugin is not installed yet, tell the user to run:openclaw plugins install clawhub:clawlink-plugin
text markdown The resulting device credential is stored locally in OpenClaw's plugin config and is only sent to `claw-link.dev`. The user should not paste raw credentials into chat.markdown ClawLink provides tools dynamically based on what the user has connected. You do not need to know tool names or schemas in advance.markdown ### Execution 1. Call `clawlink_describe_tool` before using an unfamiliar tool, before any write, or when the request is ambiguous. 2. Use the returned schema, `whenToUse`, `askBefore`, `safeDefaults`, `examples`, and `followups`. 3. Prefer market, event, order-book, balance, and position reads before placing or canceling orders. 4. For writes or anything marked as requiring confirmation, call `clawlink_preview_tool` first, then confirm with the user. 5. Execute with `clawlink_call_tool`.Technical Analysis
The Skill instructs users to install
clawhub:clawlink-pluginwithout specifying an immutable version, cryptographic digest, or independently verified artifact. The plugin's source and executable implementation are not included in the audited project, preventing this audit from verifying its credential handling, network behavior, update process, or enforcement of transaction confirmations.The dependency is particularly sensitive because it stores a local device credential, obtains tool definitions dynamically from an external service, and brokers access to financial account operations ...[truncated 1997 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin the plugin to a specific, reviewed version and cryptographic digest rather than installing a mutable package reference.
- Publish and verify signed releases, provenance attestations, and reproducible build information.
- Include or vendor the exact plugin source used by the Skill so credential storage, network destinations, update behavior, and confirmation enforcement can be audited.
- Restrict remote tools to an explicit allowlist of reviewed operations and schemas. Reject unknown or materially changed definitions until separately approved.
- Apply least-privilege scopes to the connected Polymarket account and separate read-only access from order-management access where supported.
- Require an immediate, explicit user confirmation for every portfolio-affecting call after displaying normalized order parameters, price, quantity, side, market, expiration, fees, and maximum loss.
- Independently validate transaction parameters rather than relying exclusively on remotely supplied
safeDefaults, examples, previews, or descriptive metadata. - Store device credentials in an operating-system-backed secret store, limit file and process access, redact credentials from logs, support revocation, and document rotation procedures.
- Document the plugin's permitted domains and block unexpected outbound connections.
- Provide a tested rollback and revocation process for compromised plugin releases or service credentials.
