T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:45- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Plugin Installation and Activation
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 45–49
Vulnerability Type: T08: Insecure Dependencies
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
bash openclaw plugins install clawhub:clawlink-plugin openclaw config set tools.alsoAllow '["clawlink-plugin"]' --strict-json openclaw gateway restartThe same allowlisting and restart instructions are repeated in the troubleshooting procedure at
SKILL.md, lines 211–215:bash openclaw config set tools.alsoAllow '["clawlink-plugin"]' --strict-json openclaw gateway restartTechnical Analysis
The setup procedure installs executable third-party plugin code from the ClawHub package source, explicitly adds that plugin to OpenClaw's allowed tools, and restarts the gateway so the installed component becomes active.
The dependency is referenced only as
clawhub:clawlink-plugin. No exact version, immutable artifact digest, lockfile, or required signature verification procedure is provided. Consequently, the effective code installed by users can change after this skill has been reviewed. The plugin implementation is not included in the audited project, so its behavior and permission boundaries cannot be verified from the available artifact.Although the document describes the plugin as “verified,” that statement is not accompanied by locally verifiable integrity information. This creates supply-chain exposure if the package, publisher account, distribution service, or mutable release is compromised.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the plugin publisher account, package distribution channel, or an unpinned future release of
clawlink-plugin. - The attacker publishes a modified plugin under the package identifier used by the skill.
- A user follows the documented setup instructions and installs the package without validating a version or cryptographic digest.
- The configuration command explicitly allowlists the installed plug ...[truncated 1139 chars]
- An attacker compromises the plugin publisher account, package distribution channel, or an unpinned future release of
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin the plugin to an exact, reviewed version rather than installing a mutable package reference.
- Pin and verify a cryptographic digest for the distributed artifact before installation.
- Require package-signature verification and document the trusted publisher identity and signing key.
- Publish the plugin source and reproducible-build instructions so the distributed artifact can be compared with reviewed source code.
- Use a dependency lockfile or an equivalent immutable dependency manifest.
- Review the plugin's requested permissions and grant only those required for PhantomBuster operations.
- Do not automatically allowlist or activate the plugin until its origin and integrity have been validated.
- Add guidance for safely rolling back and revoking the plugin if its package or publisher is compromised.
- Apply the same integrity checks to the troubleshooting procedure before it re-enables and reloads the plugin.
