T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
Error
- Location
- SKILL.md:53
- Finding
- Overly Broad Cross-Service Google OAuth Authorization## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md:53` **Vulnerability Type**: Excessive OAuth permissions and failure to enforce least privilege **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Code Snippet ```markdown ## Authentication ClawLink manages the full Google OAuth flow with broad scopes. Connect at [claw-link.dev/dashboard?add=google-super](https://claw-link.dev/dashboard?add=google-super). The connection grants access to all bundled Google services. ``` Related security guidance at `SKILL.md:65-69`: ```markdown ## Security & Permissions - **Read** tools are safe and require no confirmation - **Write** tools require confirmation before execution - Batch delete, clear values, and data erasure are high-impact - Access is scoped by the Google OAuth permissions granted during connection ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill directs users to grant a hosted third-party OAuth intermediary broad authorization covering all bundled Google services. The declared integration includes Gmail, Calendar, Drive, Docs, Sheets, Slides, Meet, Tasks, Photos, Maps, Google Analytics, and Google Ads, with more than 400 tools available through one connection. This authorization model does not follow least privilege for common requests. A user who only needs to send an email, list calendar events, or update one spreadsheet is instructed to authorize unrelated services and data categories. The assertion that all read operations are safe and require no confirmation is also unsafe. Read operations can retrieve sensitive email content, Drive documents, meeting transcripts, recordings, photos, account metadata, analytics information, and advertising data. Although the network transmission through ClawLink is part of the declared hosted integration rather than a concealed exfiltration mechanism, it creates a third-party trust boundary for highly sensitive information. ### Attack Path 1. A user installs the integration and connects a ...[truncated 1461 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Replace the single broad authorization flow with incremental, service-specific OAuth authorization. 2. Request only the scopes needed for the operation explicitly selected by the user. 3. Separate unrelated services into independently enabled integrations or permission groups. 4. Default all unrelated tools and destructive capabilities to disabled. 5. Require explicit, context-rich confirmation for sensitive reads as well as writes. The confirmation should identify the service, resource, fields being accessed, recipient or destination, and expected effect. 6. Require stronger confirmation for permanent deletion, bulk mutation, file sharing, email transmission, and advertising-account changes. 7. Provide an interface that shows currently granted scopes and allows users to revoke individual services without disconnecting the entire integration. 8. Minimize data forwarded through ClawLink, encrypt data in transit and at rest, apply short retention periods, and document subprocessors and logging behavior. 9. Enforce server-side authorization per tool rather than relying only on catalog visibility or agent instructions. 10. Replace the statement that all read tools are safe with a risk-based policy that treats private content retrieval as a sensitive operation.