T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Warning
- Location
- SKILL.md:28
- Finding
- Unverified Remote Package Installation Creates a Supply-Chain Risk## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 28-30 **Vulnerability Type**: Unpinned package-index installation **Risk Level**: Medium **Vulnerable Code Snippet**: ```bash pipx install resume-ats ``` ### Technical Analysis The installation instructions direct users to install `resume-ats` from the package index configured for `pipx`. The command does not specify a version, cryptographic hash, verified repository URL, or signed artifact. It therefore does not bind the installed package to the source code that was audited. The effective code installed by this command can change after the skill has been reviewed. If the indexed package is compromised, replaced, transferred to a malicious maintainer, or resolved through a malicious package mirror, users may install attacker-controlled code while believing they are installing this project. This is a dependency and distribution-chain weakness. The audited local source does not itself retrieve or execute a payload through this command; exploitation depends on an attacker gaining control over package resolution or the remotely distributed package. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises or otherwise gains control of the `resume-ats` distribution on the configured Python package index, or causes the victim to use a malicious package mirror. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious release under the package name expected by the documentation. 3. A user follows `SKILL.md` and runs `pipx install resume-ats`. 4. `pipx` retrieves and installs the remotely supplied distribution without verifying that it corresponds to the audited project revision. 5. Attacker-controlled code can execute when exposed installation behavior is triggered or when the installed `resume-ats` command is invoked. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation would execute attacker-controlled Python code with the privileges of the user running `pipx`. This could permit access to files, envi ...[truncated 445 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Prefer installation from the reviewed local source tree: ```bash pipx install . ``` 2. If package-index installation must be supported, pin an exact trusted release: ```bash pipx install "resume-ats==0.1.0" ``` 3. Publish releases through a controlled CI/CD pipeline and use signed release artifacts or package-index trusted publishing. 4. Provide cryptographic checksums for distributed artifacts and document a verification step before installation. 5. Maintain a lock file with hashes for transitive dependencies where the deployment workflow supports it. 6. Ensure that the package name, publisher identity, source repository, and release version are explicitly documented so users can verify that the retrieved package matches the audited project.
