T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
templates/AGENTS.md:7- Finding
Untrusted Bootstrap File Can Hijack Agent Instructions and Erase Evidence
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This CLI template is not clearly malicious, but it gives agents broad persistent-memory and autonomous workspace-editing instructions that users should review before installing.
Before installing, review and edit the templates. Remove or constrain the BOOTSTRAP.md follow-and-delete rule, require explicit approval before writing memory or modifying AGENTS.md, TOOLS.md, or skill files, and make heartbeat activity read-only unless you deliberately opt in to specific file changes. Also expect Japanese-language documentation and placeholders.
templates/AGENTS.md:7Untrusted Bootstrap File Can Hijack Agent Instructions and Erase Evidence
templates/AGENTS.md:9Persistent Action Items Are Prioritized Over the Current User Request
templates/AGENTS.md:42Conversation Content Can Be Persisted and Converted into Governing Agent Instructions
templates/AGENTS.md:240Heartbeat Instructions Authorize Unapproved Workspace and Memory Modification
The natural-language content throughout the file is exclusively Japanese, and there is no indication that the skill is intentionally limited to Japanese users or that other language options are available. The policy specifically calls for flagging language or locale constraints when they are imposed without user opt-in or justification.
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
# エージェントのワークスペースを作成
mkdir -p ~/.openclaw/workspace/my-cli-tool
# テンプレートをコピー
cp -r ~/.openclaw/workspace/skills/cli-tool-template/templates/* \
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
# エージェントのワークスペースを作成
mkdir -p ~/.openclaw/workspace/my-cli-tool
# テンプレートをコピー
cp -r ~/.openclaw/workspace/skills/cli-tool-template/templates/* \
The manifest description is written entirely in Japanese and the rest of the skill documentation also assumes Japanese as the interaction language. Under the policy, language constraints should be opt-in or explicitly justified; this file does not offer a language choice or explain a required locale.
The instruction to delete BOOTSTRAP.md on first run authorizes file deletion without requiring explicit user confirmation or even a user-facing notice. Even if intended as workspace hygiene, this normalizes autonomous destructive behavior and could remove information needed for auditability, troubleshooting, or user review.
The skill directs the agent to create and update memory/ files and MEMORY.md as part of normal operation without clearly warning the user that workspace files will be modified automatically. This can lead to silent persistence of conversation-derived data, including sensitive context, and creates side effects users may not expect from a template skill.
Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.
## Safety
- Don't exfiltrate private data. Ever.
- Don't run destructive commands without asking.
- `trash` > `rm` (recoverable beats gone forever)
- When in doubt, ask.
Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.
**Ask first:**
- Publishing to PyPI/npm without approval
- Accessing external systems without credentials
- Running commands that affect system-wide state
- Pushing to public repositories
The phrase 'Proactive work you can do without asking' explicitly authorizes autonomous actions, including running tests and updating documentation. In this workspace context, that makes the skill more dangerous because it encourages unattended changes and command execution during background heartbeats, increasing the chance of unintended side effects or silent modifications.
- Nothing new since last check
- You just checked <30 minutes ago
**Proactive work you can do without asking:**
- Run tests and check coverage
- Update documentation
The heartbeat section authorizes proactive background edits such as updating documentation and memory files without explicit approval at the time of change. This increases risk because the agent may alter project artifacts outside the user's immediate awareness, potentially introducing inaccurate edits, leaking sensitive context into files, or creating hard-to-audit changes.
The instructions and operational guidance are entirely in Japanese, which effectively imposes a specific language on users. The file does not indicate that this is region-specific, nor does it offer an opt-in or alternative language.
This markdown file defines when the heartbeat should run using a placeholder ('頻度 - 例: 1日1回、1日2回') instead of a concrete cadence. That makes the activation condition ambiguous and could lead to inconsistent or unintended invocation timing.
This markdown file contains user-facing natural-language content exclusively in Japanese across the listed changelog entries. Under the stated policy, forcing a specific language without user opt-in can be a locale-policy violation, and this file does not indicate that the skill is intentionally region-specific or that alternative languages are available.
This markdown template uses Japanese placeholder text throughout the user profile fields, including the language field itself, which can impose a specific language/locale expectation in the skill content. The file does not explicitly state that users may choose any preferred language or locale beyond examples, so it risks a mild language-policy issue.
No suspicious patterns detected.