Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
ClawScan rates this skill suspicious because its instructions include an installer that downloads a mutable latest-release script and runs it without verifying it; analysis was also incomplete for one referenced file.
Consider the verdict suspicious before installing. The main reported risk is running an unverified installer script from a mutable URL. Scanner coverage was partial: 11 of 12 components were fully inspected, with a referenced file only partially analyzed. The scan therefore does not provide complete evidence about that file.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
3. Read [Gateway preparation](references/gateway-preparation.md). Discover without mutation, let the tester choose source and mode, then prepare the selected ta
Piping the remote response directly into bash immediately turns downloaded content into executable instructions, without a verification step. This is the same underlying installer vulnerability identified by SC2, rather than a separate attack chain; installation consent does not establish that the fetched script is trustworthy.
it before continuing:
curl -fsSL https://github.com/openclaw/ocm/releases/latest/download/install.sh | bash
ocm --version
Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.
Never continue release validation in that task after changing the skill.
On `continue with current skill`, continue normally. For `current`, continue
without asking. For `ahead-of-latest`, `local-modifications`,
`different-source`, `untracked`, or `check-failed`, report the installed source
and version plus the status briefly and continue without offering an automated
update; the checker could not prove that replacing this copy is safe.
The installer is fetched from a mutable latest-release URL and executed without verifying its integrity or authenticity independently. Explicit installation approval and an official GitHub origin reduce unauthorized-action concerns, but a compromised release could still execute arbitrary code with the tester's privileges; checking the installed version afterward cannot prevent that execution.
it before continuing:
curl -fsSL https://github.com/openclaw/ocm/releases/latest/download/install.sh | bash
ocm --version