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Security audit

Openclaw Debugging

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is rated benign because the scanners found no AIG issues and the two reported flags were judged consistent with debugging, though coverage was partial and confidence is medium.

The verdict is benign, but not risk-free. Consider the privacy of any attachments the skill may copy locally. Skillspector completed its scan of the two listed components, but overall analysis was partial because references to files outside the artifact could not be resolved, so the evidence is incomplete.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (2)

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 101)May include surrounding context.

md
- Per-agent data plane: `~/.openclaw/agents/<agentId>/agent/openclaw-agent.sqlite`.
  Canonical schema: `src/state/openclaw-agent-schema.sql`.
- Hosted/systemd installs keep state under the service user's home (e.g.
  `/home/openclaw/.openclaw/...`), not root's — root may carry a separate
  stray install with different agents. If the expected agent dir is missing,
  locate the real DB: `find / -maxdepth 6 -name openclaw-agent.sqlite`.

The workflow copies user attachments to the local machine without warning about the privacy implications of creating additional copies.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly instructs the agent to copy remote user attachments locally and read them as debugging evidence. These files may contain private user data, but the workflow does not warn that this transfers that data to another machine; the separate payload-redaction and read-only database guidance does not address this exposure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.