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Security audit

Library of Babel

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is low-risk from a security standpoint, but its documentation is inconsistent about local storage and the package appears incomplete.

Install only if you are comfortable with a skill that may store user-added passages in a local codex file if that optional feature is implemented. Treat the included documentation as incomplete because the Python engine and demo files it references were not present in this artifact.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (3)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The trigger phrase 'what is the address of' is overly broad and not clearly constrained to the Borges/Library-of-Babel domain. In an agent environment, this can cause accidental invocation on unrelated requests involving addresses, leading to wrong-tool activation, confusion, and possible unintended processing or persistence of user content through the codex-related features.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

At line 10 the skill asserts 'No storage' and elsewhere frames codex access as a static read, yet the same document advertises adding entries that are 'persisted immediately.' This creates a deceptive data-handling representation that can undermine informed consent and safe use even if no direct code execution or exfiltration is shown.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The documentation makes strong privacy and persistence claims such as 'No database. No storage.' but later describes persisting user-provided entries to codex.json immediately. This mismatch can mislead users and downstream agents about data retention behavior, causing them to share text under false assumptions that nothing will be stored.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.