T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
src/process-file-manager.js:25- Finding
Path Traversal Enables Arbitrary File Writes Outside the Intended Workspace
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is mostly a document and task-plan generator, but it has unsafe file-writing scope and can carry untrusted analysis text into AI-executable plans.
Review before installing. Use it only with trusted input files, run it in a constrained workspace, validate projectName values, and manually review generated AI execution plans before giving them to tool-enabled agents.
src/process-file-manager.js:25Path Traversal Enables Arbitrary File Writes Outside the Intended Workspace
src/ai_plan_generator_v2.py:251Untrusted Analysis Content Is Embedded into Downstream AI Agent Instructions
Even if the skill only manages file locations and writes reports, that is still materially different from pure document generation and introduces filesystem side effects. Undisclosed directory creation and file writing can overwrite artifacts, leak project structure, or be abused in automation pipelines that trust the stated purpose.
Even if the skill only manages file locations and writes reports, that is still materially different from pure document generation and introduces filesystem side effects. Undisclosed directory creation and file writing can overwrite artifacts, leak project structure, or be abused in automation pipelines that trust the stated purpose.
Even if the skill only manages file locations and writes reports, that is still materially different from pure document generation and introduces filesystem side effects. Undisclosed directory creation and file writing can overwrite artifacts, leak project structure, or be abused in automation pipelines that trust the stated purpose.
Even if the skill only manages file locations and writes reports, that is still materially different from pure document generation and introduces filesystem side effects. Undisclosed directory creation and file writing can overwrite artifacts, leak project structure, or be abused in automation pipelines that trust the stated purpose.
Even if the skill only manages file locations and writes reports, that is still materially different from pure document generation and introduces filesystem side effects. Undisclosed directory creation and file writing can overwrite artifacts, leak project structure, or be abused in automation pipelines that trust the stated purpose.
Even if the skill only manages file locations and writes reports, that is still materially different from pure document generation and introduces filesystem side effects. Undisclosed directory creation and file writing can overwrite artifacts, leak project structure, or be abused in automation pipelines that trust the stated purpose.
Even if the skill only manages file locations and writes reports, that is still materially different from pure document generation and introduces filesystem side effects. Undisclosed directory creation and file writing can overwrite artifacts, leak project structure, or be abused in automation pipelines that trust the stated purpose.
The code and comments encode a policy that security fixes are lowest priority and not for immediate execution. In a task-generation skill, this is dangerous because it directly shapes downstream execution plans and may cause known vulnerabilities to remain unaddressed while additional functionality is built on top of them.
Skill contains instructions that could directly expose system prompts, internal rules, or hidden instructions to users or external parties.
rules.append(clean_rule)
# Limit to top 5 most relevant rules
return rules[:5] if rules else ["No specific business rules identified"]
def _clean_business_rule(self, rule_text: str) -> str:
"""Clean business rule text to remove technical implementation details"""
The generated output explicitly instructs consumers to handle security remediation last, normalizing delayed fixes even when vulnerabilities may be severe. In an automated planning context, this can systematically deprioritize urgent security work and increase the window of exposure for known issues.
The skill advertises behavior that creates and manages files/directories, yet it does not declare any explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. In an agent environment, undeclared file read/write capability weakens least-privilege controls and can allow the skill to access or modify workspace content in ways users and orchestrators may not expect.
An overly broad invocation description makes it easier for an orchestrator or user to apply the skill in contexts far beyond its safe operating assumptions. In combination with undeclared file access and behavior mismatches, this increases the chance the skill will be invoked on sensitive repositories or documents and perform unintended reads/writes.
The skill silently ingests an external security audit and folds the results into its generated plan, even though its stated role is plan generation from analysis artifacts. That behavior introduces undeclared capability and can cause sensitive audit findings to be propagated to outputs or downstream agents unexpectedly.
The code reads a hard-coded file from /Users/admin/.openclaw/workspace instead of limiting itself to the user-supplied analysis directory. This expands the skill's trust boundary, creates hidden data dependencies, and can leak unrelated local security-audit content into generated outputs without the caller's knowledge.
This JavaScript file contains user-facing natural-language descriptions and generated document content in Chinese, including the top-level skill description and downstream section text. Under the stated policy, forcing a language/locale without opt-in is a natural-language policy violation unless the skill explicitly offers a language choice or documents a justified locale restriction, which is not present here.
Multiple methods return hardcoded Chinese strings for business objectives, scope, constraints, deliverables, risks, and the final assembled document. Because these are the primary user-visible outputs and there is no alternative language path or opt-in, the skill violates the language/locale policy for all users outside that locale.
This JavaScript file contains user-facing and instructional natural language almost entirely in Chinese, including class comments, generated titles, descriptions, and validation standards. Because there is no indication that the skill is region-specific or that users can opt into another language, this creates a language/locale policy concern under the rule for forced language without user choice.
This JavaScript file contains natural-language descriptions and generated report text exclusively in Chinese, including class documentation and user-facing analysis messages. That imposes a specific language/locale on users and downstream consumers without any documented opt-in or alternative locale support.
The file-level description is written entirely in Chinese and states the component generates context documents, but it does not offer any language selection or explain that the skill is intended only for a Chinese-language environment. This creates a natural-language locale policy concern because the skill appears to assume a fixed language without user opt-in.
The generator hardcodes what appear to be concrete secrets and credentials in integration specifications, including values like secret123 and client secrets. Even if these are placeholders, emitting credential-shaped values in generated artifacts normalizes insecure secret handling, risks accidental deployment with default credentials, and can leak sensitive configuration into source control or downstream systems.
This code embeds Chinese-only natural-language descriptions and console messages for general-purpose commands, which imposes a specific language on users without opt-in. The policy explicitly disallows forced language or locale unless the tool offers a choice or is clearly justified as region-specific.
The manifest says the skill generates campaign, task, and context documents from minimal input, implying the provided input drives the generated output. In the generate-context command, the code reads campaignFile but does not parse or use its contents; instead it constructs a fixed campaignInfo object with example values, so the generated context documents do not actually reflect the supplied input.
The file's natural-language descriptions are entirely in Chinese, including the top-level module comment and method docstrings, with no indication that language selection is optional or region-specific. Under the policy for natural-language content, forcing a specific language without user opt-in is a locale/language policy concern.
The file’s natural-language descriptions and generated task/document labels are written exclusively in Chinese, indicating an implicit language constraint. Under the policy, forcing a specific language without user opt-in is a natural-language locale violation because the skill does not document any language choice or region-specific justification.
The inline comment says Phase 3 security fixes are 'as inventory, not for immediate execution,' suggesting reference-only output. However, the generated tasks are stored alongside executable phases and exported under 'ai_execution_plan' in JSON, which presents them as part of the execution plan rather than merely informational inventory.