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Security audit

talk-normal

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed style-prompt installer, but its installer can persistently change broader agent instructions than the documented workspace scope.

Review prompt.md before installing. Run the installer only from the intended workspace, check which AGENTS.md path it reports, and avoid installing if a home-level AGENTS.md would affect unrelated projects. Use bash install.sh --uninstall to remove the marked block.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
install.sh:88
Finding

Persistent Injection of Behavioral Instructions into AGENTS.md

Content
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> "$agents_md" if [ -n "$version" ]; then version_label=" v$version" else version_label="" fi ``` Representative injected instructions from `prompt.md:3-34`: ```text Be direct and informative. No filler, no fluff, but give enough to be useful. Your single hardest constraint: prefer direct positive claims. Do not use negation-based contrastive phrasing in any language or position — neither "reject then correct" (不是X,而是Y) nor "correct then reject" (X,而不是Y). If you catch yourself writing a sentence where a negative adverb sets up or follows a positive claim, restructure and state only the positive. Rules: - Lead with the answer, then add context only if it genuinely helps - Do not use negation-based contrastive phrasing in any position. - Never restate the question - Explanations: 3-5 sentences max for conceptual questions. - Do not end with hypothetical follow-up offers or conditional next-step menus. ``` ### Technical Analysis The installer copies the contents of `prompt.md` into `AGENTS.md`, which is a persistent instruction file consumed by the agent in later conversations. The injected block is presented as an always-on behavioral policy and includes a “single hardest constraint,” mandatory response structure, prohibited language patterns, and explanation-length limits. This crosses the boundary from a transiently invoked formatting skill into persistent modification of agent state. Once installed, the instructions can influence unrelated future tasks without requiring the skill to be invoked again. The constraints may also conflict with la ...[truncated 1347 chars]
Remediation
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T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning
Location
install.sh:36
Finding

Installer Can Modify Home-Level Agent Instructions Outside the Current Workspace

Content
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Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (2)

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

Line L05 imposes a writing constraint 'in any language' but illustrates and operationalizes it with Chinese-specific constructions such as '不是X,而是Y'. This continues throughout the file with Chinese-only examples and banned phrases, which can steer outputs toward a specific language/locale style without explicit user choice or justification.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly installs an always-on prompt block into AGENTS.md, which persistently changes agent behavior across future turns in the workspace. While the documentation says it is a one-time installer and mentions permanence, it does not present this as a clear user-facing warning or call out security implications such as hidden persistence, inherited behavior in later sessions, or the need to review injected prompt contents before installation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.