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Security audit

AgentWallex Payment

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is openly a crypto payment integration, but it can move real funds to arbitrary addresses and stores payment-capable API credentials locally with limited safety guidance.

Install only if you trust the publisher and intend to let an agent help manage crypto payments. Use sandbox/testnet first, keep production keys limited and revocable, protect the local config file, and require a manual review of recipient address, chain, token, amount, and environment before every transfer.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (6)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The README explicitly tells users the agent will help create an API key and save credentials locally, but it provides no warning about the sensitivity of those credentials or guidance on secure storage. In a skill that authorizes financial operations, unclear handling of API keys increases the risk of accidental exposure, unsafe local persistence, or users granting broad payment authority without understanding the consequences.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The README advertises outbound USDC/USDT transfers as a core capability without any warning that blockchain transfers are value-transferring and typically irreversible. In the context of an agent skill that can initiate payments across multiple chains, this omission is more dangerous because users may enable or invoke transfers without safeguards, increasing the chance of accidental loss or abuse.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
Initiates a transfer from an agent's wallet.

```bash
curl -s -X POST \
  "$AGENTWALLEX_BASE_URL/agents/AGENT_ID/transfer" \
  -H "X-API-Key: $AGENTWALLEX_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding
curl -s -X POST \ "$AGENTWALLEX_BASE_URL/agents/AGENT_ID/transfer" \ -H "X-API-Key: $AGENTWALLEX_API_KEY" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
Step 2 — Transfer funds (only if balance is sufficient):

```bash
TX=$(curl -s -X POST \
  "$AGENTWALLEX_BASE_URL/agents/AGENT_ID/transfer" \
  -H "X-API-Key: $AGENTWALLEX_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding
curl -s -X POST \ "$AGENTWALLEX_BASE_URL/agents/AGENT_ID/transfer" \ -H "X-API-Key: $AGENTWALLEX_API_KEY" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
-H "X-API-Key: $AGENTWALLEX_API_KEY" | jq '.[0].available'

# Transfer USDC
curl -s -X POST \
  "$AGENTWALLEX_BASE_URL/agents/$AGENT_ID/transfer" \
  -H "X-API-Key: $AGENTWALLEX_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding
curl -s -X POST \ "$AGENTWALLEX_BASE_URL/agents/$AGENT_ID/transfer" \ -H "X-API-Key: $AGENTWALLEX_API_KEY" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Content
---
name: agentwallex-openclaw
description: Create and manage AI agents, send USDC/USDT payments, check balances across Ethereum, BSC, and Tron
homepage: https://agentwallex.com
emoji: 💳
metadata: {"openclaw": {"requires": {"bins": ["curl", "jq"], "configPaths": ["~/.openclaw/agentwallex/config.json"]}, "zeroConfig": false, "disableModelInvocation": false, "humanConfirmation": {"required": true, "actions": ["transfer", "pay"]}}}
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
Create and manage AI agents, send USDC/USDT payments, check balances across Ethereum, BSC, and Tron homepage: https://agentwallex.com emoji: 💳 metadata: {"openclaw": {"requires": {"bins": ["curl", "jq

VirusTotal

66/66 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.destructive_delete_command

Documentation contains a destructive delete command without an explicit confirmation gate.

Warn
Code
suspicious.destructive_delete_command
Location
SKILL.md:113