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Security audit

迁移打包与部署 (Migration Pack & Deploy)

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill has a clear migration purpose, but it handles sensitive assistant memory through external scripts that are not included for review.

Review this before installing if the assistant memory may contain secrets, private notes, tokens, or account details. Only run it when you trust the local pack.py and deploy.py scripts, keep the archive private, and prefer an encrypted backup or isolated test restore first.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (2)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The trigger phrases are broad enough to match ordinary conversation about changing computers, restoring work, or moving platforms, which can cause the skill to activate in contexts the user did not intend. Because this skill performs packaging and deployment of sensitive assistant memory and invokes external scripts, accidental activation increases the risk of unintended file operations and disclosure of persistent memory data.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Content
This skill moves sensitive assistant memory between machines. The following are **hard limits**, not suggestions:

### Scope — what it may touch
- READ/WRITE is limited to: `~/.workbuddy/` (assistant memory & config), the workspace `.workbuddy/memory/` directory, and ONE user-confirmed output directory (default `~/Downloads/谢尔比的礼物/`).
- It NEVER reads or writes anything outside these paths: no system files, no unrelated user documents, no other apps' data.

### Data flow — nothing leaves the machine
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
The skill is explicitly designed to persist and migrate sensitive assistant memory, identity, habits, and configuration across machines by reading from and writing to ~/.workbuddy and workspace memory. Even though this is framed as the intended feature and bounded by local-only rules, it still creates a real security/privacy risk because highly sensitive session state is packaged into a portable archive that could be copied, accessed by others, or restored onto an unintended system.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.