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Security audit

Ragie.ai-RAG

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed Ragie.ai RAG helper that sends user-selected documents and queries to Ragie for ingestion, retrieval, and document management.

Install this only if you intend for selected documents, URLs, queries, filters, and metadata to be processed by Ragie.ai. Keep RAGIE_API_KEY private, use partitions or filters for scoping, and review document IDs carefully before confirming deletion.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (4)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill exposes a document deletion command as a normal management action without requiring an explicit confirmation step or warning that the action is destructive and potentially irreversible. In an agent setting, this increases the chance of accidental or over-broad deletion from ambiguous user requests, causing data loss in the connected Ragie knowledge base.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/ingest.py (reported line 60)May include surrounding context.

python
payload["partition"] = partition
    if metadata:
        payload["metadata"] = metadata
    resp = requests.post(f"{API_BASE}/documents/url", headers=headers, json=payload)
    resp.raise_for_status()
    return resp.json()

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

This code sends the user-provided query, and potentially metadata filter contents, to Ragie.ai via an HTTP POST request. While the module docstring identifies the service, there is no runtime warning, confirmation, or explicit disclosure that user-supplied content is being transmitted off-system.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding

The code accesses the RAGIE_API_KEY environment variable to authenticate outbound requests. Although this is functionally necessary and documented in the docstring, there is no explicit warning or disclosure to the user at execution time that credentials from the environment will be used for external network access.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.