T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:43- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Packages and Mutable Repository Dependency
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Locations:
SKILL.md:43SKILL.md:53-54references/ace-step.md:13-15references/basic-pitch.md:14references/librosa.md:15references/pretty_midi.md:16
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned and mutable third-party dependencies
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
SKILL.md:43:bash pip install basic-pitch pretty_midi librosa soundfile numpySKILL.md:53-54:bash git clone https://github.com/ace-step/ace-step.git pip install -r ace-step/requirements.txtreferences/ace-step.md:13-15:bash git clone https://github.com/ace-step/ace-step.git cd ace-step pip install -r requirements.txtreferences/basic-pitch.md:14:bash pip install basic-pitchreferences/librosa.md:15:bash pip install librosareferences/pretty_midi.md:16:bash pip install pretty_midiTechnical Analysis
The installation instructions do not pin Python packages to reviewed versions, validate package hashes, or pin ACE-Step to an immutable commit. Consequently, executing these commands installs whatever versions are currently selected by the package index and the current contents of the repository's default branch.
Python packages and source repositories can execute code during installation and later when imported. The ACE-Step repository is especially mutable because
git cloneretrieves the latest default-branch revision rather than a reviewed commit or signed release. Its unpinnedrequirements.txtcan introduce additional mutable transitive dependencies.This does not establish that any current upstream component is malicious. The weakness is that the effective installed code can change after this Skill has been audited, leaving users exposed to upstream account compromise, malicious releases, dependency confusion, or compromised transitive dependencies.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises an upstream package, one of its transitive dependencies, the ACE-Step rep ...[truncated 1245 chars]
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Pin every direct dependency to a specifically reviewed version, for example through a locked requirements file.
- Generate hashes for all distributions and install with hash verification:
bash python -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.lock- Pin ACE-Step to an immutable, reviewed commit rather than the mutable default branch:
bash git clone https://github.com/ace-step/ace-step.git cd ace-step git checkout <reviewed-full-commit-hash>- Verify the selected commit or release using upstream signatures or independently published checksums where available.
- Lock and audit all transitive requirements used by ACE-Step rather than installing an unconstrained upstream
requirements.txt. - Install dependencies inside a dedicated virtual environment or container under a non-privileged account.
- Integrate dependency vulnerability and provenance scanning into release review.
- Periodically update pins through an explicit review process instead of resolving the latest dependency versions during installation.
