T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:112- Finding
Untrusted Email Metadata Is Forwarded into the Agent System-Event Channel
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This is a real email CLI skill, but it handles mailbox credentials and live email actions with several under-scoped safety issues users should review before installing.
Install only if you are comfortable giving this tool an email app password that can read and send mail. Prefer a dedicated low-risk mailbox or app password, verify the exact repository/version before installing, avoid putting passwords directly in shell history, and do not use the provided system-event watch pipeline unless email metadata is treated as untrusted and actions require explicit user confirmation.
SKILL.md:112Untrusted Email Metadata Is Forwarded into the Agent System-Event Channel
SKILL.md:5Installation Instructions Use a Mutable and Inconsistently Named Source
internal/config/config.go:38Email App Passwords Are Exposed Through Command Arguments and Plaintext Configuration
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
type Account struct {
Name string `yaml:"name"`
Email string `yaml:"email"`
Password string `yaml:"password"` // app password (TODO: keychain)
Provider Provider `yaml:"provider"`
IMAPHost string `yaml:"imap_host"`
IMAPPort int `yaml:"imap_port"`
When account.IMAPTLS is false, the code uses imapclient.DialInsecure and then immediately performs LOGIN with the user's email and password. That exposes credentials and mailbox traffic to interception or manipulation by any network attacker on the path, which can lead to account compromise and unauthorized email access.
The README states that the tool is for Korean email services and is 'Korean email first,' which signals a locale-specific constraint. The file does not offer a language/locale choice or explain that the restriction is a deliberate region-specific limitation, so it reads as a forced locale preference.
The markdown instructs users to add an email account by passing an app password on the command line, which is a sensitive credential operation. The README provides setup steps but no warning about password exposure risks such as shell history, process listings, or how the credential is stored.
The title and description explicitly present the skill as a Korean email CLI skill and all user-facing instructions are in Korean, without offering any language choice or documenting that the locale restriction is required. This can violate language/locale policy when a skill forces a specific language absent user opt-in or clear justification.
This skill enables reading mailbox contents and sending outbound email, but it does not warn the user that using it may expose sensitive message data and trigger external communications on the user's behalf. In an agent setting, that omission increases the chance of unintended privacy loss, accidental disclosure of mailbox contents, or unauthorized-looking email actions without informed consent.
The command collects an email password and persists the account object via config.Save without any visible warning that credentials will be stored in the local configuration file. This is dangerous because users may unknowingly place long-lived secrets on disk, where they can be exposed through weak file permissions, backups, sync tools, or accidental disclosure.
The command description explicitly brands the tool as a 'Korean email CLI' and 'CLI for Korean email services' without any indication of optional language or locale selection. This is a natural-language locale constraint that appears mandatory rather than user-chosen or clearly justified as a region-specific compliance requirement.
The Account struct explicitly stores the email password in configuration and the Save function serializes the entire config to ~/.nmail/config.yaml. Although the file is written with 0600 permissions, plaintext local storage of credentials increases exposure through local compromise, backups, syncing tools, accidental disclosure, and other software reading the file; there is also no user-facing warning or safer secret-storage mechanism.
The skill description includes commands for reading, searching, watching, and sending email, all of which involve transmitting or retrieving user message data over external email services. The README does not include any warning that these actions access live mailbox contents and may expose sensitive data to remote providers or logs.
This code connects to an IMAP server and sends search parameters including sender, subject, text, and date filters as part of a remote search request. While network access is expected for a mail search command, this file contains no confirmation prompt, comment, docstring, or user-facing notice indicating that query contents are transmitted to the configured mail account server.