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Security audit

需求分析助手

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a plain Markdown skill for drafting and reviewing product requirements, with no bundled scripts, persistence, credential handling, or hidden automation.

Installers should treat this as a drafting aid, not an authority for final product, legal, payment, privacy, reward, or compliance decisions. It may create local PRD or HTML demo files when asked and may use private templates if you provide them, so review generated requirements before sharing or implementing them.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • System Prompt LeakageDirect Leakage, Indirect Extraction, Tool-Based Exfiltration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (7)

Direct Prompt Extraction

High
Category
System Prompt Leakage
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill contains instructions that could directly expose system prompts, internal rules, or hidden instructions to users or external parties.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/prd-template.md (reported line 76)May include surrounding context.

md
| Function name |  |
| User story |  |
| Trigger condition |  |
| Display rule |  |
| Operation rule |  |
| Data rule |  |
| Permission rule |  |

Direct Prompt Extraction

High
Category
System Prompt Leakage
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill contains instructions that could directly expose system prompts, internal rules, or hidden instructions to users or external parties.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/visual-prototype.md (reported line 37)May include surrounding context.

md
- Status tabs or state switcher for not started, ongoing, reserved, claimed, and ended
- Admin fields for campaign time, reward name, inventory, rules, and publish status

## HTML Demo Output Rules

If file creation is available:

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The description says to use the skill when users ask to "analyze, break down, draft, review, standardize, prototype, or visualize product requirements," which is a very wide set of generic verbs without explicit trigger boundaries or exclusions. In a manifest-style file, this can cause unintended activation for ordinary drafting or review requests that may not actually be about this specific skill's intended scope.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/visual-prototype.md (reported line 126)May include surrounding context.

md
## Quality Guardrails

- Do not infer hidden rules as facts.
- Do not assume payment, reward inventory, personal data, or compliance rules without confirmation.
- Do not describe invisible image areas as if they are present.
- Keep screenshot analysis useful for PRD drafting, not just visual description.
- For competitor references, avoid copying brand assets, logos, or proprietary copy into final deliverables.

Scope Creep

Low
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Skill's behavior or capabilities extend beyond its stated purpose. Scope creep allows an agent to perform actions unrelated to its documented functionality, increasing the attack surface.

Content

Scanner excerpt · LICENSE.txt (reported line 12)May include surrounding context.

text
Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so.

THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS
FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR
COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER
IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
76% confidence
Finding

The documentation states that no scripts, network calls, secrets, or executable installers are included, which reads as a strong safety/intent claim about the skill package. However, the same README later instructs users to run executable installer and management commands such as $skill-installer install, openclaw skills install, and openclaw skills check, so the documentation overstates the absence of executable tooling around the skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
83% confidence
Finding

This markdown file applies to SQP-1, and its activation guidance is broad: it says to use the reference whenever a requirement belongs to several large domains and to 'choose the nearest scenario' without defining clear boundaries between when this reference should or should not be used. The absence of explicit exclusions or negative examples could cause unintended or inconsistent invocation for adjacent product requirements.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.