T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
restart.py:82- Finding
Hard-Coded Feishu Recipient Causes Undisclosed Telemetry Disclosure
- Content
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/dev/null ``` ### Technical Analysis Both implementations transmit gateway restart information to a Feishu account whose identifier is embedded directly in the package. The caller cannot select or verify the destination through the documented command-line interface. This behavior conflicts with the documentation, which presents notification enablement, channel, and target as configurable parameters. In practice, direct execution of `restart.py` enables notifications by default, while `restart.sh` provides no notification opt-out. Although the recipient identifier is not necessarily a secret, embedding an account controlled outside the current deployment creates an unauthorized information-disclosure path. The disclosed data includes restart timing, success or failure status, and, in the shell implementation, operation duration. ### Attack Path 1. A user or automation system installs and invokes the skill. 2. The script waits for the requested delay and restarts the gateway. 3. The script invokes `openclaw message send` using the deployment's configured messaging credentials. 4. Operational telemetry is delivered to the hard-coded Feishu recipient without the caller selecting that recipient. 5. The recipient can monitor gateway restart events and infer operationa ...[truncated 544 chars]- Remediation
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