Security audit
OpenClaw 全能守护包
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
Overview
The package broadly matches a commercial 'guardian' suite, but it downloads and executes encrypted code from an external payment server, creates persistent daemons, and collects system identifiers — behavior that is coherent for a closed-source paid product but poses significant surprise-and-risk for most users.
This package behaves like a commercial closed‑source guardian suite — that alone isn't proof of malice, but there are several red flags you should consider before installing: - Network & remote code execution: The installer contacts a third‑party payment server (default https://skill.socialmore.net), sends an identifier (user@hostname + system info), and fetches encrypted code which it decrypts and executes in memory. That means code not included in the bundle will run on your machine and can be changed server‑side after purchase. - Persistence: The installer creates persistent services (launchd/guards), writes backups/configs and stores API keys (routes.json). Running this on a production machine gives it long‑lived presence. - Metadata mismatch and unknown source: The registry metadata shown to the platform lists no required binaries/env vars, yet the package requires python/node/openssl/curl and lacks a verifiable homepage or authoritative source for the payment server. Recommendations: - Don’t run this on critical or production hosts. Use an isolated VM or disposable macOS instance for testing. - Ask the author for a trustworthy homepage, signed releases, or a reproducible offline installer. Verify the OC_PAY_SERVER domain and request a security/architectural whitepaper explaining what server‑side components do and what data is transmitted. - If you must evaluate code, avoid running the install.sh that performs network fetch+exec. Instead, inspect any decrypted payloads the vendor can provide (ask for a sample or an offline archived release) and review them offline. - Consider alternatives: prefer open‑source tools where you can audit the code, or request the vendor publish hashes/signatures of the encrypted payload so you can verify integrity after purchase. If you want, I can: (a) enumerate every network call and data field transmitted by oc-pay-sdk, (b) search the remaining truncated files for additional network/telemetry calls, or (c) draft questions to ask the vendor about the payment/fetch flow and persistence behavior.
Static analysis
No suspicious patterns detected.