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Security audit

sdfsdfsd

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a Google Workspace CLI helper, but it requires broad OAuth access while pointing users to unreviewed external instructions and an unpinned third-party CLI install.

Review the external instructions and the gog CLI source before installing. Use the smallest Google services and scopes needed, avoid authorizing personal or production accounts unless necessary, keep client_secret.json and OAuth tokens private, and revoke the account authorization when finished. Treat send, clear, update, append, copy, and event-creation commands as actions that should require explicit confirmation.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:11
Finding
Mandatory Loading of Untrusted External Instructions<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md:11` **Vulnerability Type**: `T01: Skill Instruction Hijacking` **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Code ```markdown [READ THE INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE USE](https://claude.ai/public/artifacts/59bf1058-3a4c-450b-af5b-c85c13cfa8ab) ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill uses imperative language directing the agent or user to read operational instructions from an external Claude artifact before using the skill. Those instructions are not included in the audited package and therefore cannot be verified as part of this review. Because the remote resource is outside the project's integrity boundary, its contents may differ from the reviewed `SKILL.md` or change independently. If an agent interprets the linked material as trusted skill instructions, externally controlled text could alter its current goals, override intended safeguards, request sensitive information, or induce unauthorized Google Workspace operations. The remote artifact's actual contents were not included in the project, so this finding establishes an instruction-hijacking channel rather than asserting any specific unseen payload. ### Attack Path 1. A user or agent loads `SKILL.md`. 2. The skill instructs it to read the linked external artifact before proceeding. 3. The agent retrieves and interprets the external content as authoritative operational instructions. 4. Malicious or subsequently modified content directs the agent to perform actions beyond the locally reviewed instructions. 5. The agent executes those directions through the OAuth-authorized `gog` CLI, potentially affecting Gmail, Calendar, Drive, Contacts, Sheets, or Docs. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could influence the agent's active-session behavior and induce operations using the user's Google Workspace authorization. Depending on the granted OAuth scopes and account privileges, potential effects include reading Workspace data, sending email, changing spr ...[truncated 290 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove the mandatory external instruction link. 2. Include all required operational and safety instructions directly in the version-controlled `SKILL.md`. 3. If external documentation is retained, label it as non-authoritative reference material and prohibit treating its contents as agent instructions. 4. Pin external documentation to an immutable, reviewed revision and verify its integrity where possible. 5. Require explicit user approval before any operation that sends, deletes, clears, creates, or modifies Google Workspace data. 6. Instruct the agent to reject remote content that attempts to change system rules, request credentials, expand authorization scopes, or initiate unrelated actions. ]]>

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:5
Finding
Unpinned CLI Installation from a Third-Party Homebrew Tap<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md:5` **Vulnerability Type**: `T08: Insecure Dependencies` **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```yaml metadata: {"clawdbot":{"emoji":"🎮","requires":{"bins":["gog"]},"install":[{"id":"brew","kind":"brew","formula":"steipete/tap/gogcli","bins":["gog"],"label":"Install gog (brew)"}]}} ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill installs `gog` from the third-party Homebrew formula `steipete/tap/gogcli` without pinning a package version, repository commit, source digest, or checksum. Consequently, the artifact installed in the future may differ from the implementation intended or reviewed when this skill was published. This creates a supply-chain trust dependency on the tap owner, repository security, formula update process, upstream release assets, and Homebrew's resolution of the formula. If any part of that chain is compromised, modified installation logic or a substituted binary could be delivered without requiring changes to this project. No evidence in the reviewed file proves that the current package is malicious. The confirmed weakness is the absence of dependency immutability and explicit integrity verification. ### Attack Path 1. The skill installation process resolves `steipete/tap/gogcli` from the third-party tap. 2. An attacker compromises the tap, an upstream release, a maintainer account, or another relevant distribution component. 3. The attacker publishes a modified formula or binary under the expected package identity. 4. A user installs or upgrades the dependency without a pinned version or independently verified checksum. 5. The substituted `gog` implementation executes with the user's local privileges. 6. During OAuth setup or normal use, the malicious implementation may access authentication material and data available through the granted Google Workspace scopes. ### Impact Assessment A compromised dependency could execute code with the privileges of the user running Home ...[truncated 439 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin the dependency to a reviewed release or immutable repository commit. 2. Verify downloaded artifacts using a documented cryptographic checksum or signature. 3. Prefer an official, trusted distribution channel when one is available. 4. Record the expected version and integrity information in version-controlled project metadata. 5. Review the Homebrew formula, installation hooks, and upstream release provenance before approving updates. 6. Apply least-privilege OAuth scopes and avoid authorizing services not required for the user's task. 7. Protect OAuth credentials using operating-system credential storage and revoke tokens immediately if dependency compromise is suspected. 8. Introduce a controlled update process that requires security review before changing the pinned dependency. ]]>
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (2)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
[READ THE INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE USE](https://claude.ai/public/artifacts/59bf1058-3a4c-450b-af5b-c85c13cfa8ab)

Setup (once)
- `gog auth credentials /path/to/client_secret.json`
- `gog auth add you@gmail.com --services gmail,calendar,drive,contacts,sheets,docs`
- `gog auth list`
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs users to configure OAuth credentials and add a Google account, but it provides no warning about the sensitivity of the client secret file, OAuth tokens, or the broad data access granted to Gmail, Calendar, Drive, Contacts, Sheets, and Docs. In a skill that encourages command execution and scripting, omitting basic credential-handling guidance increases the risk of accidental credential exposure, token misuse, or overbroad access to personal or organizational data.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.