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Security audit

User-Delegated OAuth API Access

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill has a coherent OAuth purpose, but it asks agents to handle reusable account tokens through an unpinned global CLI and may expose token payloads in command output.

Review this carefully before installing. Use only an operator-approved, pinned `clawauth` build in a trusted runtime, avoid ad-hoc global npm installs, and make sure command output containing OAuth token data is redacted or handled by a secret-safe layer rather than exposed to chats, logs, or telemetry.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Error
Location
SKILL.md:4
Finding

Unpinned Globally Installed OAuth CLI Dependency

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md:4, SKILL.md:52; duplicated in references/commands.md:12
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependency with global installation and access to sensitive OAuth credentials
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code

SKILL.md:4:

yaml
metadata: {"openclaw":{"emoji":"🔐","homepage":"https://auth.clawauth.app","requires":{"bins":["clawauth"]},"install":[{"id":"node","kind":"node","package":"clawauth","bins":["clawauth"],"label":"Install clawauth CLI (node)"}]}}

SKILL.md:52:

bash
npm i -g clawauth

references/commands.md:12:

bash
npm i -g clawauth

Technical Analysis

Both the managed installation metadata and manual fallback install the current version of the third-party clawauth npm package without specifying an exact version, cryptographic integrity value, signature, or operator-controlled artifact source. Consequently, the effective executable can change after the Skill itself has been reviewed.

The use of global installation increases the consequences of dependency compromise because npm installation lifecycle scripts and the installed CLI execute with the permissions of the package manager invocation. The dependency is particularly security-sensitive: according to the Skill, it creates remote OAuth sessions, claims token payloads, and stores reusable credentials in the operating-system keychain. A compromised or unexpectedly modified package could therefore access credentials at the point where they are decrypted or claimed, regardless of the documented end-to-end encryption model.

The repository does not include the CLI implementation, so its claimed encryption, server-side deletion, keychain handling, and network behavior cannot be independently verified from the audited files. There is no evidence in the reviewed project that the current package is malicious; the vulnerability is the unsafe, mutable trust relationshi ...[truncated 2058 chars]

Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions

  1. Pin the dependency to an exact, reviewed version in installation metadata and manual instructions, for example clawauth@X.Y.Z; do not use version ranges or implicit latest-version resolution.
  2. Require cryptographic integrity verification for the package tarball and reject installation if the expected digest does not match.
  3. Retrieve the package through an operator-controlled registry or immutable artifact repository after source review and malware scanning.
  4. Verify package provenance and signatures in the build pipeline, and retain an auditable mapping between source commit, build artifact, package version, and digest.
  5. Preinstall the approved artifact in a hardened runtime image rather than downloading it during Skill execution.
  6. Disable npm lifecycle scripts during installation where compatible, or separately audit every required lifecycle script.
  7. Avoid administrative installation privileges. Prefer a dedicated, minimally privileged runtime account and a controlled executable directory over unrestricted global installation.
  8. Vendor or reference the exact CLI source corresponding to the approved artifact so that encryption, network destinations, claim behavior, server deletion, and keychain access can be independently audited.
  9. Restrict outbound network access to documented OAuth providers and auth.clawauth.app, subject to verified redirect requirements, and monitor for unexpected destinations.
  10. Limit requested OAuth scopes to the minimum needed for each task, isolate keychain entries, redact command output, and establish a token-revocation procedure for suspected package compromise.
  11. Update both SKILL.md and references/commands.md together so the manual fallback cannot bypass the pinned installation policy.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (2)

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The documentation states that the skill avoids materializing raw tokens, but it also instructs users to run clawauth login claim <sessionId> --json and says the output includes a token payload. In an agent setting, emitting OAuth tokens to stdout/JSON is dangerous because logs, transcripts, tool outputs, or downstream components may capture and persist reusable credentials.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

This markdown file includes a manual fallback using npm i -g clawauth, which performs a global package installation and modifies the runtime environment. While the file notes that ad-hoc installs should not be the normal path, it does not explicitly warn the user that the fallback changes system state or should only be used in trusted environments.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.