T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:17- Finding
Unconditional Skill instructions trigger data storage and command execution without explicit user consent
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is a real Apple/iCloud automation package, but it asks users to give an AI their Apple ID password and 2FA code and sets up automatic background syncing with too little user control.
Review this carefully before installing. Do not paste your Apple ID primary password or 2FA codes into an AI chat; prefer app-specific passwords for calendar-only use and local interactive authentication if you proceed. Also check the launchd scheduled sync, cached ~/.pyicloud session, ~/.openclaw data, iCloud Drive uploads, and any archived status-wall/AMap location feature before enabling them.
SKILL.md:17Unconditional Skill instructions trigger data storage and command execution without explicit user consent
scripts/setup_tasks_cron.py:87Skill directs the Agent to install a persistent LaunchAgent without transparent confirmation
SKILL.md:68Skill solicits the Apple ID master password through chat and shell environment commands
archive-full-version/scripts/status_wall.py:380Archived status daemon repeatedly transmits precise iPhone coordinates to Amap
scripts/tasks_tool.py:47Sensitive reminders, notes, location anchors, and API credentials are stored without enforced restrictive permissions
SKILL.md:1Third-party Python dependencies are installed without version or integrity pinning
The skill explicitly instructs the agent to ask for the user's Apple ID primary password in chat to gain broad account access. Collecting an account password through chat creates an immediate credential-theft risk, exposes the user's entire Apple account, and defeats safer delegated or OAuth-style authentication patterns.
The onboarding asks the user to provide an Apple ID main password and later use it for account access, directly through chat. This is extremely dangerous because chat systems are not an appropriate secret-entry mechanism for primary credentials, and compromise of those logs exposes the full Apple account.
The skill asks the user to send 2FA verification codes in chat and instructs the agent to use them to complete login. Requesting one-time codes is a classic credential-phishing pattern that can bypass account protections and is especially dangerous when combined with a collected password.
The code transmits precise GPS coordinates derived from Find My to the external AMap geocoding service. Even though the environment-derived value is only an API key, the real security issue is privacy-sensitive exfiltration of live location data to a third party without strong minimization, explicit consent flow at the transmission point, or clear access controls; in this skill context, that materially increases surveillance and privacy risk.
})
url = f'https://restapi.amap.com/v3/geocode/regeo?{params}'
req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={'User-Agent': 'StatusWall/1.0'})
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=5) as resp:
data = json.loads(resp.read().decode())
if data.get('status') != '1':
The README explicitly tells users to provide their Apple ID email and main password to the AI through environment variables for login. Requesting a primary Apple account password for an AI-connected skill is extremely dangerous because it can enable full account compromise, access to personal data and devices, and abuse of linked Apple services if the secret is exposed, logged, mishandled, or reused.
This is a direct natural-language instruction to disclose highly sensitive credentials to the assistant, which is precisely the kind of social-engineering pattern that can lead users to surrender full account access. Within the context of a skill that already seeks access to health, files, photos, calendars, and device functions, asking for the main Apple password substantially amplifies the blast radius of any mishandling or compromise.
The documented behavior includes installation and management of persistent scheduled jobs, which is materially different from a simple end-user iCloud utility. Undeclared host persistence creates ongoing execution risk and can continue accessing or syncing personal data after setup.
The documented behavior includes installation and management of persistent scheduled jobs, which is materially different from a simple end-user iCloud utility. Undeclared host persistence creates ongoing execution risk and can continue accessing or syncing personal data after setup.
The documented behavior includes installation and management of persistent scheduled jobs, which is materially different from a simple end-user iCloud utility. Undeclared host persistence creates ongoing execution risk and can continue accessing or syncing personal data after setup.
The documented behavior includes installation and management of persistent scheduled jobs, which is materially different from a simple end-user iCloud utility. Undeclared host persistence creates ongoing execution risk and can continue accessing or syncing personal data after setup.
The documented behavior includes installation and management of persistent scheduled jobs, which is materially different from a simple end-user iCloud utility. Undeclared host persistence creates ongoing execution risk and can continue accessing or syncing personal data after setup.
The documented behavior includes installation and management of persistent scheduled jobs, which is materially different from a simple end-user iCloud utility. Undeclared host persistence creates ongoing execution risk and can continue accessing or syncing personal data after setup.
The documented behavior includes installation and management of persistent scheduled jobs, which is materially different from a simple end-user iCloud utility. Undeclared host persistence creates ongoing execution risk and can continue accessing or syncing personal data after setup.
The documented behavior includes installation and management of persistent scheduled jobs, which is materially different from a simple end-user iCloud utility. Undeclared host persistence creates ongoing execution risk and can continue accessing or syncing personal data after setup.
The documented behavior includes installation and management of persistent scheduled jobs, which is materially different from a simple end-user iCloud utility. Undeclared host persistence creates ongoing execution risk and can continue accessing or syncing personal data after setup.
The documented behavior includes installation and management of persistent scheduled jobs, which is materially different from a simple end-user iCloud utility. Undeclared host persistence creates ongoing execution risk and can continue accessing or syncing personal data after setup.
The documented behavior includes installation and management of persistent scheduled jobs, which is materially different from a simple end-user iCloud utility. Undeclared host persistence creates ongoing execution risk and can continue accessing or syncing personal data after setup.
The documented behavior includes installation and management of persistent scheduled jobs, which is materially different from a simple end-user iCloud utility. Undeclared host persistence creates ongoing execution risk and can continue accessing or syncing personal data after setup.
The documented behavior includes installation and management of persistent scheduled jobs, which is materially different from a simple end-user iCloud utility. Undeclared host persistence creates ongoing execution risk and can continue accessing or syncing personal data after setup.
The documented behavior includes installation and management of persistent scheduled jobs, which is materially different from a simple end-user iCloud utility. Undeclared host persistence creates ongoing execution risk and can continue accessing or syncing personal data after setup.
The documented behavior includes installation and management of persistent scheduled jobs, which is materially different from a simple end-user iCloud utility. Undeclared host persistence creates ongoing execution risk and can continue accessing or syncing personal data after setup.
The documented behavior includes installation and management of persistent scheduled jobs, which is materially different from a simple end-user iCloud utility. Undeclared host persistence creates ongoing execution risk and can continue accessing or syncing personal data after setup.
The manifest description does not disclose broad iCloud capabilities documented later, including photo access, Drive file operations, device listing, device location, remote sound, and lost mode. Users and reviewers may underestimate the sensitivity of the requested credentials and approve the skill without understanding its full power over the Apple account.
This is a duplicate detection of the same hidden-instruction block. The concealed 'iron law' is risky because it pressures the agent to store data and run commands before normal safety or consent checks.
tags: icloud, health, tasks, reminders, notes
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This is a duplicate detection of the same hidden-instruction block. The concealed 'iron law' is risky because it pressures the agent to store data and run commands before normal safety or consent checks.
tags: icloud, health, tasks, reminders, notes
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<!-- ⛔⛔⛔ 铁律:在做任何事之前必须读完这一段 ⛔⛔⛔ -->
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