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Security audit

Openclaw Tavily Search 0.1.0

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a straightforward Tavily web-search helper that uses a Tavily API key only to call Tavily's search API.

Install this only if you intend to use Tavily for web search. Running it will send your search query and Tavily API key to Tavily's API; keep the key scoped to Tavily and avoid putting unrelated secrets in ~/.openclaw/.env.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (6)

Tainted flow: 'req' from os.environ.get (line 51, credential/environment) → urllib.request.urlopen (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Content
method="POST",
    )

    with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=30) as resp:
        body = resp.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")

    try:
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
if key:
        return key.strip()

    env_path = pathlib.Path.home() / ".openclaw" / ".env"
    if env_path.exists():
        try:
            txt = env_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="ignore")
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
if key:
        return key.strip()

    env_path = pathlib.Path.home() / ".openclaw" / ".env"
    if env_path.exists():
        try:
            txt = env_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="ignore")
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Lp3

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The skill invokes a Python script that uses environment secrets, reads a local .env file path, and performs outbound network requests, but the manifest does not declare any tool scope or permissions. This creates a transparency and governance gap: an agent or reviewer cannot easily understand that the skill can access API keys and make external requests, increasing the risk of unintended secret use or data egress.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
import sys
import urllib.request

TAVILY_URL = "https://api.tavily.com/search"


def load_key():
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding
This code reads a credential from the TAVILY_API_KEY environment variable or ~/.openclaw/.env and then includes it in an outbound HTTP request payload. There is no confirmation prompt, logging, comment warning, or other user-facing disclosure that the skill accesses local credentials and sends them to a remote service.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.