T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
analyze.py:18- Finding
Untrusted External Module Loading Through a Hardcoded Search Path
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
analyze.py, lines 18–20
Vulnerability Type: Insecure dependency loading and Python module path manipulation
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
python import sys sys.path.insert(0, '/Users/yangguangwei/.openclaw/workspace-front-door') from api_client import get_copilot_dataTechnical Analysis
The skill prepends a user-specific directory outside the audited project to Python's module search path and then imports
api_clientfrom that location. The imported module is not included in the project, so its implementation, integrity, API destination, authentication behavior, TLS policy, and handling of store data cannot be verified.Because the external directory is inserted at index zero, its modules take precedence over modules available through ordinary Python search paths. Any party able to create or modify
api_client.pyin that directory can execute arbitrary Python code whenanalyze.pyis imported or run. Python executes a module's top-level statements during import, so exploitation does not require the analysis function to complete or even invokeget_copilot_data.This also creates a deployment-dependent supply-chain boundary: the reviewed skill's effective behavior can change without any modification to its audited files.
Attack Path
- An attacker obtains write access to
/Users/yangguangwei/.openclaw/workspace-front-door, or causes deployment tooling to populate that path with an untrusted file. - The attacker creates or replaces
api_client.pywith malicious Python code. - A user or agent imports or executes
analyze.py. - The call to
sys.path.insert(0, ...)gives the attacker-controlled directory first priority during module resolution. - Python resolves
from api_client import get_copilot_datato the malicious module. - The module's top-level payload executes immediately with the same operating-system identity and permissions as the agent process.
- The malici ...[truncated 879 chars]
- An attacker obtains write access to
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove the hardcoded
sys.pathmodification. - Include the reviewed API client inside the skill package and import it explicitly with a package-relative import, for example:
python from .api_client import get_copilot_data- If the client must be an external dependency, distribute it through a trusted package repository, pin an exact version and integrity hash, and use a locked dependency manifest.
- Install dependencies into a dedicated, least-privileged virtual environment rather than loading code from a developer workspace.
- Validate at deployment time that imported modules resolve to approved paths and expected file hashes.
- Restrict write access to installed code and dependency directories.
- Configure an explicit allowlisted HTTPS API origin in reviewed code. Enforce TLS certificate verification, narrowly scoped authentication, request timeouts, and response-size limits.
- Validate the API response schema before indexing or using funnel records.
- Add automated tests that fail if
api_clientresolves outside the approved package or environment.
- Remove the hardcoded