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Security audit

YingDao-GuoKe

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill stores a Yingdao community profile identifier and uses it to fetch account information from Yingdao APIs, which matches its stated purpose but needs privacy-aware use.

Install only if you are comfortable sharing your Yingdao community profile UUID and derived personalId with Yingdao API endpoints and storing those identifiers locally for future queries. Consider manually clearing artifact/data/user.json if you want to remove the binding.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (9)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly instructs collection and storage of a user's community profile link, extraction of a persistent UUID, and later querying of account-linked profile and statistics data, but it does not present a clear privacy notice or consent step before doing so. This creates a privacy risk because identifiers and personal community metadata may be collected, retained, and transmitted to third-party APIs without informed user awareness.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

This skill sends a user-linked identifier (userUuid) to an external API endpoint to retrieve personal community information. Although external API use is core to the skill's function, the transmission involves account-linked data and becomes risky because the skill does not pair it with clear user consent, data minimization, or disclosure of third-party sharing.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 79)May include surrounding context.

md
1. **用户基本信息获取**
   - 使用用户UUID查询基本信息
   - API:`https://api.yingdao.com/api/noauth/v1/sns/forum/user/query?userUuid={uuid}`
   - 从返回的`data.achieveLevel.personalHomePageLink`中提取personalId,如果不存在则无需查询开发统计数据,直接返回基本信息并告诉用户未绑定成就。
   - personalId是链接的最后一部分,例如:`https://www.yingdao.com/achievement/user/773705612499406848`中的`773705612499406848`

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

This endpoint transmits a persistent personalId to an external service to retrieve development and activity statistics tied to the user's account. In context this is expected functionality, but it still exposes account-linked behavioral data to a third party and is more sensitive because the skill stores identifiers for future reuse without a visible privacy/consent control.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 85)May include surrounding context.

md
2. **开发统计数据获取**
   - 使用personalId查询开发统计数据
   - API:`https://api.yingdao.com/api/eco/noauth/v1/achieve/info/query/appSnsData?personalId={personalId}`
   - 返回数据结构:
     ```json
     {

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill persists user binding data to a local JSON file without any visible consent, disclosure, retention policy, or protection controls. Even though the stored value is 'just' a UUID/personal binding, it links a platform user to a community identity and could expose account associations or profile metadata to other local users, backups, or logs.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill sends a user-provided UUID to api.yingdao.com for validation without an explicit user-facing warning that the identifier will be disclosed to a third party. This is a real privacy/security issue because the binding flow causes external transmission of account-linked identifiers and enables retrieval of profile information from a remote service.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

This code transmits a user UUID to an external API endpoint during validation. In the context of an account-binding skill, external transmission is expected, but it remains security-relevant because it discloses user-linked identifiers off-platform and depends on a third-party service for processing.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/yingdao_rpa.js (reported line 50)May include surrounding context.

js
async validateUuid(uuid) {
        try {
            const apiUrl = `https://api.yingdao.com/api/noauth/v1/sns/forum/user/query?userUuid=${uuid}`;
            
            const result = await this.httpGet(apiUrl, {
                'User-Agent': 'Mozilla/5.0',

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The query flow sends the bound UUID to api.yingdao.com to retrieve user profile information. This is functionally necessary for the skill, but still constitutes a genuine data exposure surface because profile-linked identifiers and fetched personal/community data leave the local environment and may be processed or logged by the remote service.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/yingdao_rpa.js (reported line 89)May include surrounding context.

js
}
    
    async queryUserInfo(uuid) {
        const apiUrl = `https://api.yingdao.com/api/noauth/v1/sns/forum/user/query?userUuid=${uuid}`;
        
        try {
            const result = await this.httpGet(apiUrl, {

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

This endpoint sends a derived personalId to an external API to fetch development and community statistics. Given the skill's purpose, the transmission is contextual and not inherently malicious, but it still expands the privacy footprint by correlating account identity with richer activity statistics from a third-party service.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/yingdao_rpa.js (reported line 105)May include surrounding context.

js
}
    
    async queryAppSnsData(personalId) {
        const url = `https://api.yingdao.com/api/eco/noauth/v1/achieve/info/query/appSnsData?personalId=${personalId}`;
        
        try {
            const result = await this.httpGet(url, {

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The skill's natural-language comments and all user-facing response strings are exclusively in Chinese, with no indication that users can select another language or locale. Under the language/locale policy, forcing a specific language without opt-in can be a policy violation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.