T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Warning
- Location
scripts/generate_image.py:2- Finding
Runtime Resolution of Unpinned Third-Party Dependencies
- Content
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=3.10" # dependencies = [ # "google-genai>=1.0.0", # "pillow>=10.0.0", # ] # /// ``` The documented invocation causes `uv` to resolve these dependencies when the script is run: ```bash uv run ~/.codex/skills/nano-banana-pro/scripts/generate_image.py --prompt "your image description" --filename "output-name.png" [--resolution 1K|2K|4K] [--api-key KEY] ``` ### Technical Analysis The inline dependency metadata uses open-ended `>=` constraints without a committed lockfile, exact versions, or package hashes. Consequently, execution is not reproducible: a future package version satisfying these constraints can be selected without having been reviewed as part of this skill. Python packages may execute code during installation, import, or normal library use. The script imports and uses both dependencies after runtime resolution. Therefore, a compromised upstream release, compromised package-distribution account, or unexpectedly unsafe future release could introduce code that executes with the privileges of the user invoking the skill. No evidence was found that the current dependency names are typosquatted or presently malicious. The finding concerns the unsafe and mutable dependency-resolution model. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the publication channel or maintainer account for a declared dependency, or otherwise causes a malicious version satisfying the open-ended constraint to be published. 2. A user invokes the script through the documented `uv run` command in an environment where the affected version has not already been safely locked and cached. 3. `uv` resolves and installs the malicious or compromised version because it satisfies `google-genai>=1.0.0` or `pil ...[truncated 837 chars]- Remediation
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", # "pillow==", # ] ``` 2. Generate and commit a lockfile containing the complete transitive dependency graph. 3. Run `uv` in locked or frozen mode so execution fails rather than silently changing resolved versions. 4. Use package hashes where supported to verify downloaded artifacts. 5. Review dependency updates before modifying the lockfile, including release notes, provenance, maintainership changes, and vulnerability advisories. 6. Prefer an internal package mirror or allowlisted package registry for controlled environments. 7. Run the image-generation process in a restricted environment with only the filesystem and network access required for the task. ]]>