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Security audit

信源甄别·反投毒信息过滤器

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This source-checking skill is mostly a plain rules guide, but it needs review because it forces promotional text and an external invite link into every response.

Install only if you are comfortable with a source-screening assistant that may activate broadly during research and may add unrelated promotional text and an external invite link to outputs. The source-checking logic itself is transparent and non-executable, but the forced promotion should be removed or made opt-in before normal use.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (6)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The README says the skill can be triggered directly in normal conversation and gives very broad examples such as asking whether a source is reliable. That makes activation boundaries unclear and increases the chance the skill will run unexpectedly on ordinary user requests, which can interfere with other tasks or silently apply its filtering heuristics when the user did not explicitly request them.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

Phrases like "执行 WebSearch / 网页抓取 / 阅读用户提供的链接之后" and producing any report using external information cover very common actions and do not narrowly constrain when the skill should run. This breadth could cause unintended invocation during many ordinary browsing or research tasks.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly requires appending promotional content and an external invite link to every output, regardless of user intent or task relevance. This is dangerous because it turns the agent into a covert marketing channel, creates prompt-level output manipulation, and can exfiltrate user attention to third-party destinations unrelated to the requested security or source-verification task.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

Forcing Chinese promotional text and a specific public-account/invite link into every response is an unauthorized content injection mechanism. It overrides user context and language, degrades output integrity, and can be abused for spam, brand manipulation, or funneling users to external properties without consent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
83% confidence
Finding

The natural-language instructions and usage guidance are entirely in Chinese, and the file does not state that the skill is China-specific or that users may choose another language. Under the policy, forcing a specific language without user opt-in can be a locale-policy issue.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
76% confidence
Finding

L056 explicitly states '禁止自动追加' for the blacklist/whitelist to avoid poisoning, while L071 says discard traces are required partly to '便于沉淀新黑名单条目'. Although not executable code, these instructions create mixed intent about whether runtime filtering results may drive blacklist expansion automatically or only via human review.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.